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THE CASE AGAINST EQUITY IN
AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW
JODY P. KRAUS* & ROBERT E. SCOTT†
The American common law of contracts appears to direct courts to
decide contract disputes by considering two opposing points of view: the ex
ante perspective of the parties’ intent at the time of formation, and the ex
post perspective of justice and fairness to the parties at the time of
adjudication. Despite the black letter authority for both perspectives, the ex
post perspective cannot withstand scrutiny. Contract doctrines taking the ex
post perspective—such as the penalty, just compensation, and forfeiture
doctrines—were created by equity in the early common law to police against
abuses of the then prevalent penal bond. However, when the industrial
revolution pushed courts to accommodate fully executory agreements, and
parties abandoned the use of penal bonds, the exclusively ex ante focus of
the new contract law that emerged rendered the ex post doctrines obsolete.
While initially intended to do justice between the parties, if used today these
doctrines perversely and unjustly deny parties contractual rights that were
bargained for in a free and fair agreement. Yet judges continue to recognize
the ex post doctrines, even as they struggle to reconcile them with respect
for the parties’ intent. Although infrequently applied, the ex post doctrines
are far from dead letter. The penumbra of uncertainty they cast over contract
adjudication continues to undermine contracting parties’ personal
sovereignty. The only case for continuing to recognize these equitable
interventions, therefore, must turn on whether they serve a new valid
purpose. We consider and reject the possible purposes of paternalism and
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anti-opportunism suggested by contemporary pluralist scholars. In our view,
the criteria governing theories of legal interpretation support the
interpretation of contract law as exclusively serving personal sovereignty
rather than any pluralist interpretation. Under its best interpretation,
contract law has no place for the ex post perspective.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................1325
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
CONTRACT LAW ......................................................................1334
A. THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW ..........................1334
1. The Limits of Contract Law at Early Common Law ..........1334
i. The Preeminence of Penal Bonds in Commercial
Exchange .........................................................................1336
ii. The Origins of Ex Post Equitable Doctrines Overriding
Party Intent ....................................................................1337
2. The Rise of the Bargained-for Executory Promise .............1339
i. The Industrial Revolution and Emergence of the Ex Ante
Perspective ......................................................................1339
ii. Justifying Default Rules on the Basis of Ex Ante
Intent ...............................................................................1342
B. THE PRIMACY OF THE LAW OVER EQUITY ..............................1343
1. Law and Equity at Common Law .......................................1343
2. The Common Law Absorbs Most of Equity .......................1344
C. THE DOMINANCE OF THE EX ANTE IN MODERN CONTRACT
LAW .........................................................................................1346
II. PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS PLURALISM ..........1349
A. LEGAL EXPLANATION, PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND
PLURALISM ..............................................................................1349
B. PLURALISM AND FIT ................................................................1352
C. REFUTING DOCTRINAL EVIDENCE OF PLURALISM: POLICING THE
BARGAIN AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ..............................................1353
1. Policing the Bargain ............................................................1353
2. Social Justice .......................................................................1354
D. REFUTING DOCTRINAL EVIDENCE OF PLURALISM: THE EX POST
DOCTRINES ..............................................................................1356
1. The Ex Post Doctrines and Social Justice ...........................1357
2. The Ex Post Doctrines and Individual Justice: The Ex Post
Fallacy ................................................................................1358
3. Ex Post Doctrines and Paternalism .....................................1361

2020] THE CASE AGAINST EQUITY IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW

1325

4. Ex Post Doctrines and Opportunism ...................................1363
5. Summary .............................................................................1366
III. THE HARMS OF THE EX POST PERSPECTIVE ................1367
A. CONTEMPORARY LIMITATIONS ON CONTRACT REMEDIES.....1367
1. Common Law Courts Require Parties to Work Around the
Penalty Rule .......................................................................1368
2. The Compensation Principle Undermines Ex Ante
Intent ..................................................................................1370
B. HARDSHIP EXCUSES FOR FAILURES TO PERFORM: FORFEITURE,
FRUSTRATION, AND IMPRACTICABILITY .................................1374
1. The Reluctance to Enforce Express Contract Terms (Herein of
Forfeiture) ..........................................................................1374
2. The Misuse of Excuse .........................................................1377
C. EX POST INTERVENTION TO SANCTION OPPORTUNISTIC
BEHAVIOR ...............................................................................1380
CONCLUSION...............................................................................1382
INTRODUCTION
When Judge Richard Posner decided Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum
Co.,1 he went out of his way to explain that the governing Illinois common
law doctrine, the “penalty doctrine,” which makes supra-compensatory
liquidated damages clauses unenforceable, was clearly unjustified. Yet
Posner applied the doctrine anyway. As a federal judge sitting in a diversity
case, Posner explained,
we must be on guard to avoid importing our own ideas of sound public
policy into an area where our proper judicial role is more than usually
deferential. The responsibility for making innovations in the common law
of Illinois rests with the courts of Illinois, and not with the federal courts
in Illinois. And like every other state, Illinois, untroubled by academic
skepticism of the wisdom of refusing to enforce penalty clauses against
sophisticated promisors . . . continues steadfastly to insist on the
distinction between penalties and liquidated damages.2

Having determined that the contract’s liquidated damages clause
operated as a penalty, Posner refused to enforce it even though it was the
product of a voluntary agreement following extensive bilateral negotiations
between sophisticated parties.3 By refusing to enforce the liquidated
1. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. Id. at 1289.
3. Posner’s decision has also been criticized on the ground that the clause did not, in fact, operate
as a penalty. See VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT DESIGN 83
(2015).
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damages clause, Lake River refused to respect the parties’ personal
sovereignty.
There are numerous instances in which parties might rationally choose
to agree to liquidated damages clauses that provide a supra-compensatory
recovery. Perhaps most significantly, contract law does not, by its default
rules, recognize sentimental, aesthetic, or idiosyncratic value in assessing
damages.4 As a default proposition, this premise makes good sense. But
courts violate personal sovereignty if they treat it as a mandatory rule that
prevents parties who have such values from opting out. Yet, the just
compensation principle, which provides a mandatory rule of compensatory
damages for breach of contract, often leads courts to do just that. A striking
example is the well-known case of Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining
Co.5 The plaintiffs, a Native American family, signed a strip-mining lease
only after foregoing a $3,000 payment in exchange for the agreement by the
Coal Company to restore their land after the end of the lease. The Coal
Company breached the agreement, leaving an unusable and unsightly tract
filled with pits and spoil banks. On appeal, the court limited the plaintiffs’
recovery to the $300 difference between the value of the land with and
without the regrading, despite expert testimony estimating the cost of
regrading at $29,000.6 Much of the Court’s opinion rests on the strict
limitations of the compensation principle and the claim that a damage award
measured by the regrading cost would confer an inequitable windfall on the
Peevyhouses in violation of that principle.7 By the same logic, the Court
would also have refused to enforce a well-drafted liquidated damages clause
designed to protect the Peevyhouses’ interest in ensuring that their land
4. See, e.g., Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Kahn, 300 F.2d 910, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“Even if [the]
action [is] brought in quantum meruit . . . the measure of recovery [is] the market value . . . .”).
Sentimental or idiosyncratic value has traditionally been described as pretium affectionis. In Thomason
v. Hackney & Moale Co., 74 S.E. 1022, 1024 (N.C. 1912), the court defined it as a “value placed upon a
thing by the fancy of its owner, growing out of his or her attachment for the specific article, its
associations, and so forth . . . .” For discussion, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a
Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
5. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Peevyhouse in 1994 in a case with substantially identical facts,
Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1994).
6. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 111, 114. The Peevyhouse family remains on the land, ungraded, to
this day. For a discussion of the effort by the Peevyhouses to bargain for regrading in their contract with
the mining company and the ongoing costs of the coal company’s deliberate breach of their agreement,
see generally Judith Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie
and Lucille, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
7. The just compensation principle in Oklahoma provides that “no person can recover a greater
amount in damages for the breach of an obligation, than he would have gained by the performance
thereof.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 96 (2020). Given that principle, the court held that allowing the
Peevyhouses to recover for the cost of regrading their land would impose “unconscionable and []
oppressive damages, contrary to substantial justice.” Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 113.
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would be restored to its original condition.8
The refusal to permit parties to protect their personal, aesthetic, or
idiosyncratic value either through express performance terms or liquidated
damages clauses is only one example of the ways in which the penalty
doctrine and its twin, the just compensation principle, undermine the parties’
sovereignty over the terms of their ex ante contract. In this Article, we
demonstrate that in the early common law courts of equity created these
doctrines, and the related doctrines of forfeiture and excuse, to prevent the
abusive enforcement of penal bonds. However, these doctrines no longer
served their original purpose once the contemporary practice of relying on
fully executory agreements (which courts began to enforce for the first time
following the industrial revolution) replaced the practice of exchanging
penal bonds to enforce commercial arrangements.
What then explains the persistence of doctrines that history shows
courts developed to prevent the abuse of archaic methods of contract
enforcement that parties abandoned over two centuries ago? And what
explains the injustices visited on the commercial seller in Lake River and the
homeowners in Peevyhouse? The answer lies in the received view that the
American common law of contracts properly directs courts to decide contract
disputes by considering two opposing points of view: the ex ante perspective
of the parties’ intent at the time of formation, and the ex post perspective of
justice and fairness to the parties at the time of adjudication.9 According to
the received view, then, American contract law has two faces. The first faces
forward. In the ordinary course, courts decide cases based on the ex ante
perspective.10 Doctrines based on the ex ante perspective support the view
that contract law provides “a domain or territory in which the self is
sovereign” and therefore vindicates the value of personal sovereignty.11
8. For discussion, see generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market Damages, Efficient
Contracting, and the Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1610 (2008).
9. We confine our thesis to the American common law of contracts. For ease of exposition, unless
otherwise indicated, all references to “American contract law,” “contract law,” “the common law of
contracts,” etc. refer only to the American common law of contracts.
10. Intention in contract law is determined objectively and prospectively. A party is taken to intend
what its contracting partner could reasonably believe it intended when the parties contracted. Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 568–
70 (2003).
11. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 52 (1986).
Feinberg explains the personal sovereignty conception of individual autonomy on analogy to state
sovereignty: “The politically independent state is said to be sovereign over its own territory. Personal
autonomy similarly involves the idea of having a domain or territory in which the self is sovereign.” Id.
Feinberg defines the personal sovereignty view as holding that “respect for a person’s autonomy is respect
for his unfettered voluntary choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions except where the interests
of others need protection from him.” Id. at 68. Although Feinberg offers the personal sovereignty
conception of autonomy as a normative basis for limiting the exercise of political coercion, we believe it
also constitutes a fundamental value in any plausible overall theory of morality. In Rawlsian terms,

1328

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1323

According to the personal sovereignty view of contracts, it is always just and
fair to the parties to hold them to agreements reached under free and fair
conditions.12 The personal sovereignty view therefore holds that contract law
exists to give effect to ex ante agreements reached under free and fair
conditions, subject to the requirements of the principles of social justice that
govern society as a whole.13 Thus, while justice in society as a whole, or
“social justice,” requires the vindication of multiple and potentially
competing values, justice between the parties, or “individual justice,”
requires only the vindication of the value of personal sovereignty by
enforcing an agreement that is just and fair to the parties.14
The second face of American contract law faces backwards. Doctrines
facing backwards take the ex post perspective by overriding agreements as
the parties’ understood them at the time they reached them. These ex post
doctrines rest on the premise that enforcing agreements according to the
parties’ intent at formation can be individually unjust, even if the parties
agreed to them under free and fair conditions.15 Consider again the penalty
rule invoked in Lake River, which provides that a “term fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a
personal sovereignty recognizes the fundamental right of individuals to choose, revise, and pursue their
own system of ends. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 19 (1993) (arguing that individuals have
the capacity for a conception of the good, which is a capacity “to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue
a conception of one’s rational advantage or good”); see also Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of
Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1608 (2009).
12. The doctrines of capacity, fraud, duress, and procedural unconscionability together restrict
enforcement to only these agreements. For a discussion of these doctrines, see infra Part II.
13. The principles of social justice provide various grounds for limiting personal sovereignty,
including the prevention of harm to others. We use the term “social justice” to refer to the domain of
issues addressed by traditional normative political theories, such as Rawls’ theory of justice, which limit
individual liberty not only to prevent harm to others but also to ensure robust equality through measures
to effect redistribution and equality of opportunity. In contrast, “individual justice” in contract refers to
the normative status of individual relationships arising out of voluntarily incurred moral obligations.
Thus, justice in society as a whole, or “social justice,” requires the vindication of multiple, and potentially
competing values. We argue, however, that justice between the parties, or “individual justice,” requires
the vindication of only the value of personal sovereignty.
14. The personal sovereignty view is not imperialistic. It is therefore consistent with the existence
of doctrines, such as illegality and public policy, that permit courts to refuse to enforce agreements
reached under free and fair conditions when necessary to satisfy the demands of social justice. Contract
law recognizes explicitly that the value of personal sovereignty does not license conduct that harms
others, and therefore limits enforcement to agreements that do not materially harm others. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 207 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). For discussion, see infra Part II.
15. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 207, 208–09 (2009) (arguing that unexpected circumstances cases “should take ex post
considerations into account” and rejecting the view that such cases “should focus exclusively on the
parties’ expectations ex ante, at the moment of contract formation, and should not take into account ex
post considerations—that is, gains and losses to both parties that either arose under the contract prior to
the occurrence of the unexpected circumstances, or resulted proximately from or were made possible by
the occurrence”).
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penalty.”16 As the Second Restatement of Contracts explains, the penalty
rule is justified by the just compensation principle: “[T]he parties to a
contract are not free to provide a penalty for its breach. The central objective
behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not punitive.
Punishment of a promisor for having broken his promise has no justification
on either economic or other grounds . . . .”17 According to the just
compensation principle, therefore, supra-compensatory damages offend
principles of individual justice: Damages in excess of the actual loss from
breach are necessarily unjust to the breaching party, even if that party agreed
in a free and fair bargain to pay such damages in the event of breach. On this
view, individual justice turns in part on facts that arise only after agreements
are formed and events unfold, and so can be discerned only by courts ex post,
at the time of adjudication.18 This is the moral logic of the ex post
perspective.
The same logic underlies other ex post doctrines that license courts, for
example, to abrogate contract terms when their enforcement would lead to
“oppressive results,” such as a “forfeiture” that imposes severe losses on one
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356.
17. Id. § 356 cmt. a; see, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 113 (Okla.
1962) (“[W]here an obligation . . . appears to create a right to unconscionable . . . damages, contrary to
substantial justice no more than reasonable damages can be recovered.”) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 23,
§ 97 (2020)); see also Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123 (1858). As noted in text, the just compensation
principle has also been invoked to justify ex post review of expectation damage recoveries. For
discussion, see infra Sections I.B.2, III.A.2.
18. Of course, doctrines designed to ensure ex post justice, so conceived, include doctrines that
license courts not only to police against contracts that turn out to be unjust in light of facts that occurred
after formation, but to police against contracts that create the risk of ex post injustice at the time of
formation irrespective of whether that risk materialized after formation. For example, U.C.C. § 2-302
holds that “[i]f the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract.” U.C.C. § 2-302
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (emphasis added). Likewise, U.C.C. § 2-718(1) states that
“[d]amages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is
reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach.” U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court in Lake River Corp. v.
Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added), holds that “[t]o be valid under
Illinois law a liquidation of damages must be a reasonable estimate at the time of contracting of the likely
damages from breach, and the need for estimation at that time must be shown by reference to the likely
difficulty of measuring the actual damages from a breach of contract . . . .” Even though these doctrines
invite courts to invalidate liquidated damage clauses without determining whether or not those clauses
turned out to be over-compensatory at the time of adjudication, they are justified on the ground that
policing against clauses that create the risk of over-compensation at the time of formation will thereby
decrease the frequency of contracts that include clauses that create a risk that courts will (mistakenly)
enforce a penalty at the time of adjudication. In short, whether they invite courts to invalidate liquidated
damages clauses based on realized ex post injustice or the ex ante risk of ex post injustice, all of these
doctrines are ultimately justified on the ground that courts should seek to prevent ex post injustice. We
are grateful to Ethan Leib for calling our attention to the apparent tension between our definition of ex
post injustice and doctrines that serve to prevent ex post injustice by policing against clauses that create
the risk of ex post injustice at the time of formation.
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party and confers a “windfall” on the other.19 These doctrines direct courts
to interpret contracts, when possible, to avoid the risk of forfeiture,20 and
empower courts to excuse conditions when their imposition will impose an
actual forfeiture.21 The power to excuse conditions applies to “a term that
does not appear to be unconscionable at the time the contract is made but
that would, because of ensuing events, cause forfeiture.”22 As Justice
Cardozo explained in the landmark case of Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,23
the enforcement of contracts—even those agreed to under free and fair
conditions—will sometimes “visit venial faults with oppressive
retribution”24 that is “grievously out of proportion to”25 the loss caused by
default. Enforcement in such cases would result in “cruelty”26 and a
“sacrifice of justice.”27 Even though ex ante contract doctrine takes the
enforcement of agreements reached under free and fair conditions to be
individually just to the parties, “courts have balanced such considerations
against those of equity and fairness, and found the latter to be the
weightier.”28
The moral intuitions fueling Justice Cardozo’s opinion are easy to grasp
and difficult to resist. If a builder has built the house he promised to build
for a landowner, but his performance falls short of perfection, it seems only
just and fair that he compensates the owner for the loss caused by his breach.
But to deprive him entirely of his right to a final payment unless he cures the
default at enormous expense seems inequitable, unjust, and unfair. As long
as he makes the owner whole, the owner should still pay him for his
performance. To do otherwise would impose a forfeiture on the builder and
provide a windfall to the owner. Surely justice cannot turn a blind eye to the
19. As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains, the “non-occurrence of a condition of an
obligor’s duty may cause the obligee to lose his right to the agreed exchange after he has relied
substantially on the expectation of that exchange, as by preparation or performance. The word ‘forfeiture’
is used . . . to refer to the denial of compensation that results in such a case.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. b.
20. Id. § 227.
21. Id. § 229.
22. Id. § 229 cmt. a.
23. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
24. Id. at 891.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Justice Cardozo also appears to believe, however, that contract law should nonetheless
always enforce even “cruel” terms that result in a “sacrifice of justice” if the parties have included them
explicitly. “This is not to say that the parties are not free by apt and certain words to effectuate a purpose
that performance of every term shall be a condition of recovery.” Id. The Restatement, however,
disagrees: “[u]nder the present Section a court may, in appropriate circumstances, excuse the nonoccurrence of a condition solely on the basis of the forfeiture that would otherwise result.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. a.
28. Jacobs & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891.
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inequity of forfeitures and windfalls, even if they happen to result from the
enforcement of an otherwise free and fair agreement. Courts must therefore
subject even agreements reached under free and fair conditions to equitable
review at the time of adjudication in order to protect the parties from the
possible individual injustice of holding them to their own commitments.
Despite their surface appeal, however, these intuitions rest on
crumbling foundations. As a moral matter, if a competent party—such as the
Garland Coal Company in Peevyhouse—agreed to bear the risk of a loss
from regrading property at a cost that exceeds the market value of the land,
and was compensated for doing so, that fact alone conclusively establishes
the justice and fairness of imposing the loss on that party.29 To hold
otherwise not only unfairly shifts a loss from the party who was paid to bear
it to the party who paid to avoid it, but also violates the personal sovereignty
of the parties to the agreement and all future contracting parties who lose the
option to make and enforce such an agreement. The intuition that profoundly
unequal post-contractual gains and losses can be individually unjust or
unfair, in and of themselves, is therefore an illusion.
As a legal matter, the view that ex post doctrines are a legitimate part
of American contract law is also mistaken. Like the light of a distant star that
died long ago, the ex post doctrines that require “just compensation,”30 forbid
penalties,31 avoid forfeitures,32 and excuse hardship33 emanate from a source
that no longer exists. Originating in the English Courts of Equity during the
early common law, the ex post perspective pervaded early contract law as a
necessary corrective to the abusive enforcement of penal bonds.34 But when
the industrial revolution led American courts to enforce executory
agreements for the first time, and reject penal bonds as potentially abusive,
the ex ante perspective alone formed the foundational doctrines that
emerged.35 The tightly woven fabric of ex ante doctrines comprising the
modern American law of contracts left no room for these ancient (and
archaic) equitable principles. Although these doctrines continue to enjoy
support from the Restatement and prominent commentators, they cannot be
29. For an argument that the opinion in Jacob &Youngs, Inc. v. Kent unfairly denied the owners
their right to restitution of the price they paid to have the builder bear the risk of repairing or replacing
defective conditions, see generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 8.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (“The parties to a contract may
effectively provide in advance the damages that are to be payable in the event of breach as long as the
provision does not disregard the principle of compensation.”).
31. Id. § 356.
32. Id. § 227.
33. Id. § 261.
34. Performance (or “penal”) bonds were the dominant legal mechanism for arranging exchange
transactions from Tudor times until the nineteenth century. For discussion, see infra Section I.A.1.
35. See discussion infra Section I.A.2.
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reconciled with American contract law’s otherwise univocal and
foundational commitment to vindicating personal sovereignty. By giving
these ex post doctrines equal billing on the marquee of American contract
law, black letter authorities create the impression that the ex ante and the ex
post are two equally important, and compatible, faces of American contract
law. They are not.36
The vestigial ex post doctrines are in fundamental tension with the
commitment to honor ex ante intent: they undermine contract law’s
commitment to vindicating personal sovereignty by requiring parties either
to use less effective means to avoid terms the doctrines forbid, or to abandon
their most preferred contracting strategies altogether in favor of less effective
ones. The more serious concern, however, is that the prominence of these ex
post contract doctrines has led to a body of scholarship that has elevated the
influence of the ex post perspective in contract adjudication well beyond the
narrow scope of the doctrines themselves. Their official status has misled
influential legal scholars into conceiving of contract law as a pluralistic
enterprise that serves justice by combining the ex ante and ex post
perspectives in every case, not merely the handful of cases to which the ex
post doctrines apply. Some scholars have called for the wholesale expansion
of the unconscionability doctrine as the primary vehicle for extending the
reach of the ex post perspective into every contract case.37 Others have
argued that the goal of preventing opportunism can explain and justify the
exercise of ex post equity.38 The pluralist account of contract law therefore
36. To be sure, courts quite properly continue to recognize the applicability of doctrines that equate
the justice of outcomes under an agreement with the justice of the bargaining process that produced it.
Rather than overriding ex ante intent, equitable doctrines such as capacity, duress, fraud, and procedural
unconscionability actually reinforce the ex ante perspective that limits enforcement to agreements reached
under free and fair conditions. See infra Section I.B.2.
37. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV.
741, 752–54 (1982) (“Over the last fifteen years, however, there have been strong indications that the
principle of unconscionability authorizes a review of elements well beyond unfair surprise, including, in
appropriate cases, fairness of terms . . . . [A] number of cases have held or indicated that the principle of
unconscionability permits enforcement of a promise to be limited on the basis of unfair price
alone . . . . As these phenomena have accumulated, it has become clear that they . . . can be explained
only on the basis of an expanded, paradigmatic concept of unconscionability that is not limited to
procedural elements such as unfair surprise . . . . This new paradigm does not replace the bargain
principle . . . . Rather, the new paradigm creates a theoretical framework that explains most of the limits
that have been or should be placed upon that principle, based on the quality of the bargain. What lies
ahead is to articulate and extend the unconscionability paradigm through the development of specific
norms, other than unfair surprise, that can guide the resolution of specific cases.”)
38. Kenneth Ayotte, Ezra Friedman & Henry E. Smith, A Safety Valve Model of Equity as AntiOpportunism (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper, Paper No. 13-15, 2013), https://papers.ss
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245098 [https://perma.cc/B38L-5ZLR]. The defenders of equity
argue that no set of legal rules can anticipate and thereby prevent the infinitely many and unpredictable
ways in which individuals might seek to subvert the parties’ intentions after they reach agreement. They
conclude that contract law therefore must subject every agreement to ex post judicial review in order to
police against opportunistic behavior that the parties could not have anticipated and thus prevented. Id. at
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treats the ex post doctrines as just one among many other contract doctrines
properly dedicated to vindicating multiple values that contract law must take
into account, in addition to personal sovereignty, in order to prevent the
enforcement of unjust agreements.39
In this Article, we offer a contrasting account of American contract law,
one that explains and understands contract as vindicating personal
sovereignty by honoring the ex ante intentions of contracting parties. On our
account, the ex post contract doctrines, as applied today, are legal error—
vestigial survivors of an originally noble effort to counteract the injustice of
an extinct contract doctrine that is long extinct. They now perversely vitiate,
rather than vindicate, justice for parties who rely on the rights and obligations
they intended their agreements to create. Moreover, these doctrines cause
harm by serving as the anchor for an academic-judicial feedback loop that
legitimizes the ex post perspective generally in contract law.40 The resulting
roving portfolio of ex post reasoning in contract cases not only increases the
risk that the outcomes of contract adjudication will be (ex ante) unfair, but
also increases the opportunity for parties to credibly threaten strategic
litigation to exact ex post redistribution of contractual gains and losses.41
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we explain how the ex post
contract doctrines became unmoored from their original rationale in the early
common law and were carried over to modern American contract law
through a combination of misunderstanding and allegiance to precedent.42
Because the early common law came to depend exclusively on the penal
bond for commercial exchange, the ex post doctrines emerged in equity to
control resulting abuses. We then show how the American common law of
contract was transformed by the industrial revolution into an institution
devoted exclusively to enforcing executory agreements according to the
25; see also George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 941, 957 (1992) (defining opportunism as “any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the
other party’s reasonable expectations based on the parties’ agreement, contractual norms, or conventional
morality”).
39. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW
ESSAYS 206, 240–41 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) (“Part of the human moral condition is that we hold many
proper values, some of which will conflict in given cases, and part of the human social condition is that
many values are relevant to the creation of a good world, some of which will conflict in given cases.
Contract law cannot escape these moral and social conditions. In contract law, as in life, all meritorious
values must be taken into account, even if those values may sometimes conflict, and even at the expense
of determinacy. Single-value, metric theories of the best content of law must inevitably fail precisely
because they deny the complexity of life. Accordingly, the theory of contracts—the principle that tells us
how to make the best possible rules of contract law—must accommodate multiple values . . . .”)
40. See infra notes 142–51 and accompanying text.
41. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule
Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1574–75 (2016).
42. Id. at 1533–45.

1334

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1323

parties’ ex ante intentions, thereby eliminating the need for penal bonds and
the ex post doctrines designed to prevent their unjust enforcement.
In Part II, we provide the philosophical basis for our claim that
American contract law is devoted exclusively to promoting the value of
personal sovereignty. We lay out Ronald Dworkin’s basic criteria for legal
explanation and argue that the personal sovereignty interpretation of contract
law fares better on those criteria than pluralism because it holds that the ex
ante doctrines, which comprise the vast majority of contract law, serve a
more compelling moral purpose. Contrary to what we call the “ex post
fallacy,” the justice and fairness of “disproportionate” or “overcompensatory” outcomes turn entirely on the ex ante justice and fairness of
the bargain that produces them. Finally, we demonstrate that the values of
paternalism and anti-opportunism are logically incompatible with respect for
personal sovereignty.
In Part III, we identify the range of harms caused by the mistaken
inclusion of ex post doctrines in American contract law. We show how the
ex post doctrines impose obstacles to preferred modes of contracting that
require parties to use less effective means for accomplishing their purposes.
We illustrate how the presence of these doctrines has cultivated a judicial
receptivity to the ex post perspective more generally, sometimes leading
courts tempted by the ex post fallacy to override the parties’ ex ante intent.
We conclude that the ex post perspective is incompatible with the personal
sovereignty account of contract law. Although American law certainly
vindicates plural and conflicting values, American contract law does not.
Personal sovereignty is limited by the requirements of social justice, but it
conflicts with no values within contract law itself.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONTRACT
LAW
A. THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW
1. The Limits of Contract Law at Early Common Law
At early common law, there was no cause of action for breach of an
informal (unsealed) executory promise. The only actions available for breach
of contract were the action in covenant (for promises under seal) and the
action for debt. The action for debt, moreover, was available only for the
recovery of a sum certain owed by the promisor to the promisee.43 The
43. JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 92
(1913); JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 322 (2d ed. 2009); A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON
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promisee bringing an action in debt sought simply to recover the amount
fixed by the parties’ agreement. The court would decide whether to award
payment based solely on the validity of the instrument, the due date, and
evidence of payment. No occasion arose for judges to fill contractual gaps or
award compensation for breach.44
The evolution of commercial exchange during the late middle ages
eventually led the English common law courts to recognize a promisee’s
right to recover for breach of an informal promise by bringing an action in
assumpsit.45 But that action was available only for plaintiffs who had either
conferred benefits or taken action in preparation for performance in reliance
on the defendant’s promise.46 In either case, a plaintiff seeking relief via
assumpsit for breach of an informal promise sought compensation under a
theory of reimbursement for the loss of whatever the plaintiff had already
given to the promisor (directly or indirectly).47 No remedy was available for
loss of the promisee’s expectancy.48 Importantly, as we explain below, the
final stage of the development of modern contract law—the enforcement of
purely executory promises—did not occur in America until the beginning of
the nineteenth century.49
LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 47–48 (1987).
44. AMES, supra note 43, at 88–89. Where a seller tendered goods to a buyer and the buyer refused
to accept delivery, the seller could sue in debt for the purchase price and force the buyer to take delivery
of the goods (for which title had passed under the contract). But alternatively, if the buyer tendered the
purchase price and the seller refused to transfer goods that were then available, the buyer’s only recourse
was to bring an action in equity for specific performance because the remedy at law was inadequate. As
a consequence of these limited options, contract default rules that assigned unanticipated risks and
specified the consequences of nonperformance were simply inapt and thus unknown. Morton J. Horwitz,
The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1974). Horwitz cites only
two English cases in the eighteenth century that even raise the issue of a default measure of damages. In
Flureau v. Thornhill [1828] 96 Eng. Rep. 635, the court limited the plaintiff to restitution damages,
holding that plaintiff could not be entitled to damages “for the fancied goodness of the bargain, which he
supposes he has lost.” In the United States, only a few actions for breach of executory contracts were
brought before the Revolution. See, e.g., Boehm & Shitz v. Engle, 1 Dall. 15, 15 (Pa. 1767), where the
seller was allowed to sue for the price of a breached contract for the sale of land.
45. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 637–46 (5th ed.
1956).
46. Assumpsit had developed initially to provide a cause of action for the negligence of a bailee or
carrier for hire. Over time, the action in assumpsit was extended to nonperformance of certain promissory
undertakings. AMES, supra note 43, at 130–31.
47. During this early period of the action in assumpsit, a plaintiff could bring an action for breach
of promise independent of the doctrine of consideration and the concept of exchange. Id. at 130. The early
notion of special assumpsit (the contract action) did not require a quid pro quo as was required for an
action for debt, which was explicitly tied to the notion of exchange. Id. at 147.
48. In the absence of legal enforcement, commercial parties relied on the law merchant and
medieval trade fairs as a means of self-enforcing informal promises. Avner Greif, Informal Contract
Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval Trade, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 287, 288–89 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
49. See infra notes 66–79 and accompanying text.

1336

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1323

i. The Preeminence of Penal Bonds in Commercial Exchange
Given that executory contracts were not legally enforceable, and actions
in debt and assumpsit provided limited legal means for parties to make
enforceable future commitments, commercial parties conducted exchange
transactions by adapting other legal mechanisms to suit their needs.50
Although contracting parties participating in annual merchant fairs often
relied on self-enforcement of their bargains,51 they also adapted the penal
bond to make legally enforceable commitments. A penal bond was a sealed
promise52 to pay a sum of money subject to a “condition of defeasance,”
which appeared on the back of the bond itself. Upon satisfaction of the
condition, the bond became void and the promisor had the right to demand
return of the bond from the promisee. The advantage of using a formal
instrument was that the promise to pay was conclusively enforceable at face
value by an action of debt on an obligation at common law, subject
essentially only to the defenses of forgery or proof of satisfaction of the
condition of defeasance.53 In effect, the bond served as a means of
specifically enforcing a contract, with the stated monetary obligation serving
as security to ensure performance.
It is hard to overestimate the importance of the penal bond to
commercial exchange during the early common law. Suits on performance
bonds were the single most common class of actions in the English courts of
law by Tudor times and they remained so for the next three centuries.54
According to Horwitz, at the beginning of the nineteenth century virtually
all large business transactions took the form of two independent bonds, each
of which stipulated damages for failure to perform an executory promise.55
To support an exchange transaction, each party would sign a bond (often for
double the value of a promised performance) that was made subject to the
defeasing condition of the successful performance of the specific service or
50. It is possible that the early common law might have been able to enforce executory promises
through the action in covenant. But covenants had to be under seal to be enforceable and this would have
limited this device to situations where the parties were prepared to go to the expense and difficulty of
sealing a deed. We are grateful to David Waddilove for alerting us to this option.
51. Greif, supra note 48.
52. A sealed promise is a promise evidenced by a writing and stamped with a wax seal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 96 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
53. See A. W. B. Simpson, The Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance, 82 LAW Q. REV. 392,
411–12 (1966) (explaining that “[t]he law governing bonds is tough law” and that such conditional bonds
were almost always enforced); see also THEODORE SEDGWICK, 3 A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF
DAMAGES; OR AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THE AMOUNT OF PECUNIARY
COMPENSATION AWARDED BY COURTS OF JUSTICE 392, 393 (Arthur G. Sedgwick & Joseph H. Beale, Jr.
eds., 2d ed. 1852) (noting a penalty “was recoverable without any reference whatever to the actual
damages incurred”).
54. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 324 (4th ed. 2002).
55. Horwitz, supra note 44, at 928.
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the delivery of goods or money at a time certain.56 If the condition was not
satisfied, the bond was enforceable and the penalty became due.57
Penal bonds thus served as the substitute for legally binding executory
contracts throughout the early common law. However, as we note below,
these bonds were not only subject to abuse, but their use hindered the
development of a law of contract: all of the contractual issues underlying the
obligations they were used to enforce, including how courts should fill gaps
in the absence of express agreement, were “hidden on the back of the
bond.”58 Indeed, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the number of
bonds used to effect commercial transactions in America greatly exceeded
the number of contracts that sought to enforce mutual promises.59 The
dominance of bonds, bills of exchange, and other sealed instruments
deprived commercial parties of the incentive to take their transactional
disputes to common law courts. As a result, the default rules of contemporary
contract law that support parties’ ex ante intentions did not develop until the
mid-nineteenth century.
ii. The Origins of Ex Post Equitable Doctrines Overriding Party Intent
All of the equitable doctrines that carried over into modern contract law
owe their origins to efforts by courts of chancery to constrain the abuses
caused by the arcane doctrines used by the courts of law to enforce the
ubiquitous penal bonds.60 Recall that if the condition on the back of the bond
was not satisfied, the bond was enforceable and the penalty became due.
Alternatively, if the condition was satisfied (for example the promisor
performed the designated service or delivered the promised goods), then the
promisor was entitled to demand return of the bond. However, if the
promisor failed to receive the bond in return for satisfaction of the condition
56. SEDGWICK, supra note 53, at 393.
57. Imagine, for example, that on January 1 a farmer promised to deliver a dozen barrels of apples
to a grocer on March 1 in return for the grocer’s promise to pay the farmer £500. To make their promises
legally enforceable, the farmer would sign a bond entitling the grocer to payment of £1000 subject to the
defeasing condition that the farmer deliver apples to the grocer at the stated time. If the farmer could not
prove satisfaction of the condition, the grocer could enforce the bond and the farmer would have to pay
the £1000 penalty. Likewise, the grocer might sign a bond entitling the farmer to a payment of £1000
subject to the defeasing condition that the grocer pay £500 to the farmer upon the delivery of the apples
on March 1 and the same enforcement conditions would apply.
58. BAKER, supra note 54, at 324.
59. Horwitz, supra note 44, at 929.
60. The English courts of law followed objective and rigid procedural and substantive rules for
enforcing penal bonds, which minimized the need for subjective judgment in their application. In
response, the Court of Chancery began to exercise overlapping jurisdiction with the common law courts
to hear cases that in “the ordinary course of law failed to provide justice.” BAKER, supra note 54, at 117;
see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 320 (“Chancery developed the practice of relieving against
a contractual obligation that was enforceable at common law, in circumstances in which permitting
enforcement would have been unjust.”).
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and the promisee subsequently sought to enforce the bond, the only defense
available to the promisor in a court of law was an “acquittance,” a formal
writing signed by the promisee stating that the debt evidenced by the bond
had been paid.61 As a result, when legally naïve promisors failed to demand
either return of the bond or an acquittance following performance, and the
bondholder sought to enforce the bond, common law courts acknowledged
that they were bound to enforce the bond even though doing so penalized a
promisor who had already performed their promise.62
Predictably, a debtor facing such a risk filed a petition in a court of
equity seeking relief from the prospect of an unjust penalty at law. Relief
against such penalties was thus one of the earliest examples of equitable
interference with courts of law that developed in response to the common
law’s lack of adequate machinery for trying cases of fraud.63 Similarly,
doctrines providing relief from forfeiture developed in Chancery alongside
the penalty doctrine and were available for parties who failed to fully
perform their obligations under the bond.64 So too, courts of chancery limited
the bondholder to “just compensation” for nonperformance under the bond,
finding that permitting the creditor to recover more than what it had lost by
non-performance of the condition was “unconscionable.” In time, courts of
equity adopted the presumption that penalty bonds should be set aside
whenever their enforcement created an unacceptable risk of oppression and
extortion.65
61. W.T. Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN
SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 9, 85 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1914). In an action in covenant brought by a
bond holder in possession of the bond, the common law courts simply could not entertain a defense that
allowed the promisor to prove satisfaction of the condition absent an acquittance. Even if the court
suspected that by seeking to enforce the bond the bond holder was fraudulently misrepresenting that the
condition had not been satisfied, the court had to enforce the bond anyway. Id.
62. In the case of bonds evidencing a loan from the bond holder to the promisor, debtors often
sought to avoid paying twice by filing a petition for relief in a court of equity, which the Chancellor
granted if “after such examination right may be done [the debtor] as reason and conscience require.” Id.
at 88. The potential for such injustice was dramatically exacerbated by the common practice in which
borrowers seeking more favorable terms from their lender knowingly signed bonds for double the amount
of their loan in order to give their lender the right to impose a penalty in the event of default. A debtor
who signed such a “penalty” bond, and paid back the debt it evidenced without receiving the bond or an
acquittance in return, could be subject to a triple payment of the face amount of the debt even though the
lender had fraudulently represented that the debtor was in default. Id. at 89.
63. See 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 292–93 (1924). In addition to granting
relief to the obligor from fraud, courts of equity also invalidated bonds upon a finding that the obligor
was illiterate or under duress or suffering mental incapacity. Here then we also find the origins of the
modern contract rules that regulate the fairness of the bargaining process. BAKER, supra note 54, at 325.
64. Courts of chancery developed the maxim that “equity suffers not advantage to be taken of a
penalty or forfeiture where compensation is made.” Id. at 326.
65. Id. at 325. The doctrine of substantive unconscionability can be traced to these early efforts by
courts of equity to limit the abuses of penal bonds.
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2. The Rise of the Bargained-for Executory Promise
i. The Industrial Revolution and Emergence of the Ex Ante Perspective
The simple action for debt, supplemented by the use of formal
instruments such as the penal bond, sufficed to facilitate mutually beneficial
contracting activity from early common law through the eighteenth
century.66 But the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century saw a
dramatic expansion of commercial enterprises and transactions, which in
turn generated new risks of unprecedented scale. The cumbersome and rigid
practice of issuing double bonds simply fell short of the need to manage the
new uncertainties facing commercial parties. In this novel environment,
parties needed better control over the process of allocating risk and reward:
they needed to shape their particular transaction by taking the contract into
their own hands. To manage their risks, therefore, commercial actors began
to innovate by creating stock and commodities contracts that used executory
promises to trade the risks of future price fluctuations.67 To give effect to the
parties’ ex ante risk allocations in these new forms of contracts, common law
courts for the first time began to award market-based damages for failure to
deliver stock certificates in a rising market68 and for the breach of fixed-price
forward contracts for the delivery of commodities.69
As these executory contracts became more common, courts for the first
time granted sellers the right to resell the contract goods upon the buyer’s
rejection and then seek market damages—the difference between the
contract and resale prices.70 Although intertwined with the common law’s
traditional equitable language of justice and fairness, the first court to create
the market damages default rule for executory contracts relied on the goal of
vindicating the parties’ presumed intent to maximize their contract’s ex ante
value:
66. During this period, commercial parties used sealed penal bonds and bills of exchange as the
primary substitute for legally binding executory contracts. Horwitz, supra note 44, at 928; see also
Simpson, supra note 53.
67. This Part of the Article draws on Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options
and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1436–47 (2004); see
also Horwitz, supra note 44, at 921–22 (arguing that enforcement of executory promises did not occur
until the rise of industrialization and the development of commercial markets in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries). Horwitz’s basic thesis—that prior to the industrial revolution the common
law of contract was dominated by notions of equity and fairness and that it was thereafter adapted to
legitimate the inequalities of the nineteenth century market economy—has been vigorously contested.
See, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533
(1979). Simpson’s critique does not, however, challenge the basic point that courts did not regularly
enforce executory contracts until the nineteenth century. We rely on Horwitz's historical account only to
the extent that it survives Simpson's critique.
68. See, e.g., Groves v. Graves, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 1 (1790).
69. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Hampton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 200 (1818).
70. See Sands & Crump v. Taylor & Lovett, 5 Johns. 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
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This [market damages] rule operates justly as respects both parties; for the
reasons which induced the one party to refuse the acceptance of the
property will induce the other to act fairly, and to sell it to the best
advantage. It is a much fitter rule than to require it of the party, on whom
the possession of the thing is thrown . . . to suffer the property to perish,
as a condition on which his right to damages is to depend . . . . [This rule]
appears to me to be founded on principles dictated by good sense and
justice.
The article was perishable, and the interest of all parties required that the
most should be made of it. Nothing, therefore, is more reasonable, than
that the plaintiffs, who were not bound to store or purchase the wheat,
should be permitted to sell it at the best price that could be obtained.
[The market damages rule] is convenient and reasonable, and for the best
interest of both parties . . . . The vendor ought to have the benefit of that
principle as well as the vendee. It would be unreasonable to oblige him to
let the article perish on his hands, and run the risk of the solvency of the
buyer.71

The court’s reasoning suggests that it believed the parties would not
have intended a forward contract in which the seller would be required to
allow rejected goods to waste instead of preserving their value by reselling
them, thereby reducing the damages from breach. The market damages
default rule thus gave effect to the parties’ ex ante intent to create a contract
that efficiently allocated market risks.72
To manage the risks of the new mass markets of the industrial age,
common law courts began to adopt additional default rules that allocated
non-price risks between the parties in the ex ante contract. Courts adopted
the rule awarding market damages for non-performance of stock and
commodities transactions as the default rule for all executory contracts that
parties made to implement their objectives. From this development evolved
the origins of the bargain principle and the American doctrine of
71. Id. at 406, 409–10. Under the older common law rule, the seller would have been required to
tender the contract goods and sue for the contract price. But in Sands, the seller covered on the market by
reselling the goods to a third party and then sought damages based upon the contract-market differential.
The court conceded that this was a case of first impression in America and granted market damages to
the plaintiff. Id. at 405–06.
72. In addition to formulating a damages default, the courts during this period developed more
clearly the principle that the “contract itself furnishes the measure of damages.” SEDGWICK, supra note
53, at 200–01. Mid-nineteenth century contract law thus distinguished and rejected a line of earlier cases
that gave the jury wide latitude and discretionary authority to determine the measure of damages, either
by reducing or enlarging the award. The amount of compensation was now regulated by the direction of
the courts, and the sole object was to ascertain the agreement of the parties, which controlled the measure
of damages. Id. Among other things, this principle was an explicit rejection of the concept of breach as
“fault.” The motives behind the breach were irrelevant. THEOPHILUS PARSONS, 2 THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 443 (1855).
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consideration.73 The evolution from commodities and stock transactions to
fully executory contracts led to one of the principal default rules designed to
reduce the risks of contracting. Based on the parties’ presumed intent to
maximize the expected value of their contracts, courts assigned to the
promisor, by default, the risks associated with any performance under the
contract, because courts implicitly presumed that the promisor was better
able to reduce the expected losses caused by unanticipated contingencies.74
Other default rules evolved during this period to protect the utility of market
contracts as mechanisms for reducing the incidence of interparty haggling75
and enhancing expected surplus, including the perfect tender rule for sales
of goods,76 the common law indefiniteness doctrine,77 and the many default
rules governing the process of offer and acceptance of terms.78 Contract
thereafter became an instrument for managing risks ex ante through
executory contracts.79
73. The bargain theory of consideration departed from the earlier common law definition of
consideration as consisting of any benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promise. The theory limiting
consideration to bargained for exchange of a promise or performance was a direct result of the market
transactions described in the text. J. Willard Hurst observed that the bargain idea of consideration emerged
as a method of market control, a legal technique employed by common law courts to regulate the market
transactions that were emerging in the early nineteenth century. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 11–13 (1956). While many of
these economic conditions existed in England prior to the colonial era, the unique combination of “legal
heritage, challenge, opportunity, and individual motivation was irrepressible” in America and resulted in
an “explosion of contract behavior.” Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued
Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1975).
74. This “performer’s risk” default rule is justified on the ground that the promisor is better able
to exercise some degree of control over the manner of its performance under the contract, either by taking
precautions to reduce the risk of an unanticipated occurrence or to take steps to reduce its impact should
it occur. This default risk allocation imposes no injustice on the promisor since the “premium” for bearing
the risks of performance are paid for by the promisee in the contract price. For discussion, see ROBERT
E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 74–94 (5th ed. 2013).
75. The judicial instinct to reduce interparty haggling (that undermines the expected value of the
contract) explains the role of the obligation of good faith in American contract law. Under common law
and the Uniform Commercial Code, the obligation of good faith is an interpretive principle and not a freestanding independent duty. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt.1. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2018). Thus, courts assume as a default presumption that both parties would agree to act with each other
in good faith to implement their agreement. This commitment deters strategic behavior which otherwise
would generate a value-destroying race to the bottom. We develop his point further in Section III.D infra.
76. See, e.g., Beals v. Hirsch, 211 N.Y.S. 293, 300 (App. Div. 1925) (“[T]he seller is bound to
tender the amount of goods contracted for in order to hold the buyer for performance.”), aff’d, 152 N.E.
414 (1926); Reuter v. Sala, 27 W. R. [1879].
77. See, e.g., Shepard v. Carpenter, 55 N.W. 906 (Minn. 1893). The indefiniteness doctrine
instructed courts to declare contracts void for indefiniteness if the parties failed to specify the outcome
for realized states of the world.
78. See, e.g., Fitzhugh v. Jones, 20 Va. 83 (1818); Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1892] 1 QB
256 (Eng.); Adams v. Lindsell, (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250. For discussion, see Arthur L. Corbin, Offer
and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169 (1917).
79. Horwitz, supra note 44, at 919.
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ii. Justifying Default Rules on the Basis of Ex Ante Intent
Over the next one hundred years, as the industrial revolution took hold
first in England and then in the United States, courts developed a
hypothetical bargain justification for implying default terms as part of a
common law court’s responsibility to interpret the parties’ agreement. In
1863, in Taylor v. Caldwell, Justice Blackburn explained the emerging
impossibility default rule as follows:
[T]his implication [of an excusing condition] tends to further the great
object of making the legal construction such as to fulfil [sic.] the intention
of those who entered into the contract. For in the course of affairs men in
making such contracts in general would, if it were brought to their minds,
say that there should be such a condition.80

Subsequently, in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes generalized the ex ante reasoning in Taylor.81
Courts, he explained, should fill gaps with rules that would facilitate
bargained for exchanges between future parties that are similar to the parties
before the court:
It is true that, as people when contracting contemplate performance, not
breach, they commonly say little or nothing as to what shall happen in the
latter event, and the common rules have been worked out by common
sense, which has established what the parties probably would have said if
they had spoken about the matter. But a man never can be absolutely
certain of performing any contract when the time of performance arrives,
and, in many cases, he obviously is taking the risk of an event which is
wholly, or to an appreciable extent, beyond his control. The extent of
liability in such cases is likely to be within his contemplation, and,
whether it is or not, should be worked out on terms which it fairly may be
presumed he would have assented to if they had been presented to his
mind.82

Thus, the motivating objective of judicial default rules was to allocate
risks that the parties had failed to consider in the same way the parties would
have allocated those risks had they bargained over the matter explicitly at the
time they formed their agreement. By filling contractual gaps in this way,
courts maximized the chances that these default risk allocations would
reflect the preferred risk allocations of future parties similar to those in the
originating case.
80. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312 (emphasis added).
81. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903).
82. Id. at 543 (1903) (emphasis added). Some years later, Justice Cardozo used the same reasoning
in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921), to adopt the rule of substantial performance
in construction cases on the grounds that “intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in
contemplation the reasonable and probable.”
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In retrospect, it is easy to see why the decisions by courts at the dawn
of the nineteenth century to legally enforce wholly executory agreements
was such a watershed event in the development of American contract law.
The dam burst thereafter, followed by a flood of innovative decisions by
common law courts responding to the demands of commercial parties for a
robust contract law. As courts continued to enforce executory promises, they
developed by necessity novel doctrines (including the array of default rules)
that were self-consciously designed to advance the objectives the parties
intended their contracts to serve at the time of formation. As the judicial
focus on ex ante intentions began to wax, the relevance of ex post equity
began to wane.
B. THE PRIMACY OF THE LAW OVER EQUITY
1. Law and Equity at Common Law
As the common law courts embraced the goal of vindicating the
contracting parties’ ex ante intentions throughout the nineteenth century, the
clash between this ex ante perspective and the ex post perspective of
common law equity was inevitable. The English common law had managed
to avoid the general tension between law and equity by creating two separate
sets of doctrines adjudicated in separate courts.83 The first originated in the
English King’s Bench and consisted of rules cast in objective terms. The
second consisted of equitable principles originating in the English Court of
Chancery, which provided an independent and alternative forum as a
response both to the procedural constraints imposed on the common law
courts and to the strict, rule-bound inclinations of common law judges.84
These equitable interventions were not meant to, and did not, displace any
of the common law rules. Indeed, for many years the Chancery’s decrees had
no formal precedential effect,85 which freed the Chancery from any concern
that its ex post rulings could undermine the consistency and predictability of
adjudication.86
83. The discussion in this part draws on Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the
Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1037–41 (2009).
84. BAKER, supra note 54, at 104; see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 320.
85. “In Chancery, each case turned on its own facts, and the Chancellor did not interfere with the
general rules observed in courts of law. The decrees operated in personam; they were binding on the
parties in the cause, but were not judgments of record binding anyone else.” BAKER, supra note 54, at
104. “So long as chancellors were seen as providing ad hoc remedies in individual cases, there was no
question of their jurisdiction bringing about legal change or making law.” Id. at 202.
86. As an example, though common law courts continued strictly enforcing penalty clauses in
breached contracts, equity courts began enjoining such enforcement in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, creating the doctrine “equity suffers not advantage to be taken of a penalty or forfeiture, where
compensation can be made.” LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 324.
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The premise of equitable jurisdiction was that justice sometimes
required courts of equity to make exceptions to the legal rules applied by the
courts of law, which assessed justice ex ante, from the point of view of the
parties at the time of formation.87 In contrast, chancellors in equity assessed
the justice of the outcome of contract disputes ex post, at the time of
adjudication. Courts of equity thus were free to determine that the resolution
of a dispute according to the legal rules was inconsistent with the parties’
intended objectives because of unanticipated contingencies that occurred
after formation. In such cases, courts of equity could set aside the legal
resolution of the dispute and use equitable principles to (re)align the contract
with the parties’ originally intended purposes.88
2. The Common Law Absorbs Most of Equity
Historically, the jurisdictional division between the common law courts
and the Court of Chancery acted as a barrier between the two incompatible
regimes. In the nineteenth century, however, the Chancery was eliminated,
and law and equity was merged in both England and the United States. This
awkward amalgam confronted courts as they began to develop a modern
American contract law.89 The tension between the ex ante and ex post was
largely mitigated by the practice of American common law courts of
absorbing most of the equitable doctrines that had developed in Chancery
and then transforming them to suit the ex ante perspective.90 As we explain
below, the First Restatement of Contracts reinforced the ex ante perspective
by cabining the historically equitable doctrines into legal doctrines
governing fraudulent and innocent misrepresentation,91 fraudulent non87. The ex ante approach of the common law courts was summarized in Waberley v. Cockerel
(1542) 73 Eng. Rep. 112, 113:
[I]t is better to suffer a mischief to one man than an inconvenience to many, which would
subvert a law: for if matter in writing may be so easily defeated, and avoided by such surmise
and naked breath, a matter in writing would be of no greater authority than a matter of fact . . . .
88. As Baker explains, “the essence of equity as a corrective to the rigour of law was that it should
not be tied to rules. If, on the other hand, no consistent principles whatever were observed, parties in like
cases would not be treated alike; and equality was a requisite of equity.” BAKER, supra note 54, at 109.
89. Ironically, by the nineteenth century, the Chancery had developed a set of procedures more
arcane and burdensome than the common law procedures it originally sought to mitigate. The resulting
administrative delay, combined with corruption born of the Chancery’s practice of paying clerks on a fee
basis rather than salary, ultimately led to the Chancery’s demise. Id. at 111–12. Soon thereafter law and
equity were merged. Id. at 114.
90. DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 203 (1999).
In general, equity-evolved contract doctrines designed to provide far broader protection against perceived
fraud than the common law provided. In particular, the core equitable contract doctrines provided relief
where an agreement was not fully voluntary or informed. Id. at 208.
91. The equitable defenses of negligent or innocent misrepresentation were the precursors to the
contemporary doctrines of fraudulent and material misrepresentation. Id. at 208; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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disclosure,92 unilateral and mutual mistake,93 and specific performance and
other injunctive relief.94 Yet, a few of the equitable doctrines absorbed into
modern American contract law could not be similarly transformed to
accommodate the ex ante perspective. Courts had designed these ex post
doctrines, such as the just compensation, penalty,95 hardship, and forfeiture96
doctrines, specifically to vitiate clear common law rules.
Because these vestigial ex post doctrines undermined contracting
parties’ ex ante intentions, courts only infrequently invoked them.
Nevertheless, this occasional validation of the ex post perspective increased
the risk of more pervasive equitable interventions. The First Restatement of
Contracts, however, significantly reduced this risk. The Reporter of the First
Restatement, Samuel Williston, sought to formalize and render coherent the
diverse legal and equitable doctrines comprising the common law of
contract.97 Williston’s Restatement formally incorporated the historically
equitable doctrines into the common law of contract as exceptions to the
92. The equity defense of wrongful silence was the precursor to contemporary non-disclosure
doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
93. IBBETSON, supra note 90, at 210.
94. Id. at 206, 213; BAKER, supra note 54, at 320.
95. The courts initially seized on the “intent of the parties” as the key to distinguishing liquidated
damages and penalties. An invalid penalty was a sum intended only as security for the performance of
the executory promise and not intended to be paid. Enforceable liquidated damages, on the other hand,
were intended to be paid by the promisor if she elected not to perform the agreement. SEDGEWICK, supra
note 53, at 398–420 (collecting cases). Subsequently, in a much-cited opinion, the Michigan Supreme
Court in Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123 (1858), rejected the intent test of enforceability. Instead, the
court held that the governing principle was that damages must be based on “the principle of just
compensation for the loss or injury actually sustained.” Id. at 133. The court held that the task for the
parties was to specify just compensation ex ante in those instances where they had a comparative
advantage over a court seeking to do so ex post. Such comparative advantage would exist where the
provable loss from the breach of the contract was uncertain, remote, or speculative. While Jaquith
purported to restrict party sovereignty over stipulated damages, the Jaquith rule actually gave substantial
latitude to nineteenth century contracting parties. Given the then-prevailing view that lost profits could
not be recovered because they were too remote or speculative, the anticipated losses in most commercial
contracts would be difficult to prove. Consequently, parties had considerable freedom to stipulate
damages under the Jaquith rule. For further discussion of the evolution of the contemporary penalty
doctrine, see Scott & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1436–47.
96. The forfeiture doctrine is another example of a pre-modern equitable doctrine that has survived
the merger of law and equity. BAKER, supra note 54, at 202–03. The forfeiture doctrine authorizes courts
to set aside implied and express conditions under certain circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 229 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). We critique the forfeiture doctrine in Section III.B infra.
97. Williston’s formalism rested on several basic claims: that contract terms could be interpreted
ex ante according to their ordinary meaning, and that written terms (and thus the parties’ intended means)
have priority over unwritten expressions of agreement (that might better reveal their intended ends). In
particular, Williston elevated the parol evidence and plain meaning rules as mechanisms for cabining
equitable interventions by courts interpreting disputed contracts. See, e.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 631 (3d ed. 1979) (“The parol evidence rule requires, in the absence of fraud,
duress, mutual mistake or something of the kind, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or written,
where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing.”). For discussion, see Dennis M.
Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169, 186–88 (1989).
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common law rules that applied only in specific circumstances. As a result,
the judicial evolution of novel equitable exceptions largely came to a halt.98
By enshrining these views in the First Restatement, Williston’s
reformulation significantly influenced the subsequent adoption of contract
doctrine by state courts as they decided contract disputes.99
The formalist consensus that followed in the wake of the First
Restatement minimized the perceived judicial license to exercise equitable
discretion in contracts cases. Notably, despite the effort of subsequent
private law makers to reframe this consensus in the Second Restatement, the
Willistonian resolution of the law-equity dialectic remains today the
dominant approach in American contract law, endorsed by courts in the large
majority of states.100 The majority of common law courts now understand
and apply contract law to support contracting parties’ ability to choose ex
ante their contractual means for maximizing the expected value of their
contracts.
C. THE DOMINANCE OF THE EX ANTE IN MODERN CONTRACT LAW
The preceding review of the history of the American common law of
contracts highlights the explicitly ex ante reasoning judges have used over
two centuries to explain the decisions creating its bedrock doctrines. As
noted above, when common law courts began to resolve disputes over
executory contracts that lacked express terms governing those disputes, they
confronted the necessity of creating default terms to allocate unexpected
risks. The common rationale given by courts to justify their default rules was
that the disputing parties would have agreed to the same risk allocation had
they been required to bargain over that matter at the time of contracting.
But how did the common law courts decide just how the parties would
have allocated any given risk? The answer is that courts reasoned, either
explicitly or implicitly, that most parties intend to minimize the expected
costs of contracting in order to maximize their contract’s ex ante value. The
judicial rationale supporting this reasoning is that both parties are equally
98. See Patterson, supra note 97, at 169–70.
99. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 240 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
100. A large majority of U.S. courts continue to follow the traditional, formalist approach to contract
interpretation that preferences the chosen means to achieve their purposes that parties reflect in their
written agreements. A state-by-state survey of recent court decisions shows that thirty-eight states follow
the traditional textualist approach to interpretation. Nine states, joined by the Uniform Commercial Code
for sales cases (hereinafter UCC) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, have adopted a contextualist
or anti-formalist interpretive regime. The remainder are indeterminate. See State-by-State Survey (on file
with authors). But see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Contract Interpretation 2.0: Not Winner-Take-All but
Best-Tool-For-The-Job, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.1625 (2017) (recent state survey finds a number of states
have adopted an intermediate position on the text versus context debate).
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motivated ex ante to reduce the collective costs of bearing the risks of their
contractual venture. Based on this premise, courts allocated contractual risks
by default to the party better able to bear them.101 The justification for this
risk assignment is that the party to whom the risk is allocated will (in
exchange for a compensating payment) agree to bear the risks that she is best
able to reduce (or insure against) by taking appropriate precautions. Both
parties gain by acting to make the inevitable risks of contracting smaller than
they otherwise would be, thereby enhancing the expected value of their
collaborative enterprise. In this way, each contracting party can act as an
insurer of the promises it gives to the other, and the parties implicitly
impound the “premium” for this insurance in the price for the goods or
services provided under the contract.102 Thus, given the assumption that
parties intend to maximize the expected value of their contracts, these
defaults are the risk allocations that most parties would intend to incorporate
into their agreements.
The evolutionary story we have just described supports the claim that
virtually all of the American common law of contracts derives from two
premises: the purpose of contract law is to discover and enforce the parties’
ex ante intent and most parties intend to maximize the expected value of their
contracts at the time they form them. There are many accounts in the
literature of how this ex ante perspective on optimal risk-bearing explains
the outcomes of American common law contract cases.103 The explanatory
power of that perspective even accommodates doctrines such as the duty to
101. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
102. This risk reduction principle is one of the oldest default rules in contract law, tracing its lineage
to Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897; see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
103. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101
YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and
Economic Rationality: The Geometry of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49; Richard Craswell, Contract
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA.
L. REV. 967 (1983) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle]; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE. L.J. 1261 (1980); Goetz
& Scott, supra note 4; Thomas H. Jackson, “Anticipatory Repudiation” and the Temporal Element of
Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospective Nonperformance,
31 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1978); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of
Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,
Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific
Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978); Alan Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1976); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
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mitigate104 and the widespread practice of relational contracting105 that
appear at first blush to challenge the primacy of the ex ante perspective. The
personal sovereignty view of contracts not only demonstrates that these
analyses largely succeed, but also argues that their success serves as the
cornerstone of a genuine interpretive theory of American contract law. The
best interpretation of contract doctrine understands its sole purpose to be the
vindication of the personal sovereignty of contracting parties by supporting
their presumed ex ante intentions.
***
The history and content of American contract law reveals the singular
evolution of common law doctrine towards a wholesale embrace of the ex
ante perspective, a perspective that carves out “a domain or territory in which
the self is sovereign.”106 However, the same history also shows continuing,
albeit limited, instances where ex post doctrines are used to trump the parties
ex ante choices, even those that are made freely under fair conditions. In our
view, such instances are pathological. These ex post interventions are
inconsistent with a robust conception of personal sovereignty in which
104. At first blush, the mitigation doctrine appears to be an ex post obligation imposed on the
nonbreaching party. But to the contrary, this doctrine is clearly congruent with the claim that contract law
supports the parties’ ex ante choice to impose on each other an ex post obligation for the purpose of
maximizing the expected value of the contract. Although some contract theorists view the mitigation
doctrine as deeply incompatible with respect for the parties’ promissory moral commitments, see
generally, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV.
708 (2007), the doctrine actually reflects the parties own most likely understanding of the ex post
obligations each agreed to undertake at the time of formation, see Kraus, supra note 11, at 1638. Contract
law’s mitigation doctrine anticipates that parties will agree ex ante to extend efforts in sharing information
and undertaking subsequent adaptations as necessary to minimize the expected joint costs of adverse
future events, even when those events lead one of the parties to breach. Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation
Principle, supra note 103.
105. One reason parties enter relational contracts is to avoid disruption and the spillover effects of
volatility. In output and requirements contracts, for example, they achieve this objective by having each
party agree ex ante to trade off some of the upside of a future market movement in their favor in return
for more protection on the downside. Their stated goal is to keep both parties “in the money” at every
period over the life of the contract. By enforcing these agreements despite the parties’ reliance on vague
standards of performance, courts might create the impression that their primary goal is to provide ex post
justice by limiting opportunism. But the judicial enforcement of relational contracts is better explained
by the parties’ ex ante intent to use the relational bonds that repeated interactions create to maximize the
expected value of their contracts. By reinforcing informal norms of trust and reducing volatility, the
parties reduce the “haggling” that can result from period to period efforts to extract maximum individual
gains. Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, 23 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 337 (1980). By assigning discretion ex ante to the party who values it more, and constraining
that discretion through both formal and informal mechanisms, the parties can “smooth the bumps” that
otherwise impose spillover costs that impair contract value. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10. The
motivation of courts to require cooperative adjustment in relational contracts need not be attributed to
policing opportunism ex post at the expense of the parties’ ex ante intentions. Rather, it is more naturally
attributed to the contracting parties’ presumed intent simply to deploy informally enforced norms of trust
and fairness to regulate their contractual conduct. Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in LongTerm Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005, 2040–42 (1987).
106. FEINBERG, supra note 11, at 52.
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“respect for a person’s autonomy is respect for his unfettered voluntary
choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions except where the
interests of others need protection from him.”107 The question, then, is
whether the personal sovereignty view better explains American contract law
than a pluralist account that purports to accommodate both the ex ante and
ex post perspectives. We turn to that question in Part II.
II. PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS PLURALISM
The examination of the history and content of the modern American
common law of contract grounds our claim that its sole purpose is to
vindicate personal sovereignty as embodied in the ex ante intentions
expressed by contracting parties under free and fair conditions. In this Part,
we set out the general criteria of adequacy for explanatory legal theories and
then explain why the personal sovereignty account satisfies these criteria
better than pluralism, its chief competitor.
A. LEGAL EXPLANATION, PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND PLURALISM
The nature of legal explanation has been hotly contested over the last
century, dating back at least to the publication of H.L.A Hart’s The Concept
of Law.108 For present purposes, however, we rely on Ronald Dworkin’s
theory of legal interpretation because it provides a well-known, accessible,
and plausible starting point for understanding the criteria governing an
explanatory theory of law.109 Dworkin equates legal explanation with what
he calls “constructive interpretation.”110 For Dworkin, a constructive
interpretation has three stages. The first is the “pre-interpretive” stage, in
which the legal objects of inquiry to be interpreted are preliminarily
identified, such as cases, rules, principles, statutes, and the like. The second
is the “interpretive” stage, in which participants in the practice of law attempt
to identify purposes that the practice of law purports to serve in the legal
sources identified at the pre-interpretive stage. For Dworkin, two
considerations guide interpretation. First, the interpreter must seek an
interpretation that casts the law in its best moral light by holding it to be
serving the best moral purpose possible.111 As Dworkin describes it, “the
107. Id. at 68.
108. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
109. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
110. See id. at 65–68. This section draws on Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law:
Groundwork for the Reconciliation of Autonomy and Efficiency, in 1 LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
385 (Enrique Villanueva ed., 2002), and Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287 (2007).
111. As Stephen Perry explains this requirement,
[t]his involves showing how the practice, construed in terms of a certain point or function that
might plausibly be attributed to it, could under specified conditions give rise to moral
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interpreter settles on some general justification for the main elements of the
practice identified at the preinterpretive stage. This will consist of an
argument why a practice of that general shape is worth pursuing, if it is.”112
Second, the interpreter seeks an interpretation that meets a “threshold” of fit
with the legal sources being interpreted.113 The third is the “postinterpretive” stage, in which the interpreter “adjusts his sense of what the
practice ‘really’ requires so as better to serve the justification he accepts at
the interpretive stage.”114 The best interpretation is therefore the one that
constitutes the optimal trade-off between casting the law in its best moral
light, in both the interpretive and post-interpretive stages, and “fitting” the
legal sources that constitute the law as a preinterpretive matter.
As the previous historical discussion has shown, the vast bulk of case
law and the legally authoritative materials comprising the modern law of
contract (contract law’s “preinterpretive” legal objects of inquiry) aim
explicitly at vindicating the parties’ ex ante intent. At the conclusion of our
interpretive stage, we conclude that the explanation that best fits the
preinterpretive facts and casts contract law in its best moral light understands
contract law’s exclusive purpose to be the vindication of personal
sovereignty, even though this interpretation does not fit the ex post doctrines.
In the Dworkinian framework, a lack of perfect fit between an interpretation
and the legal “data” does not itself disqualify a candidate interpretation.
Instead, the framework requires only that a proposed interpretation fit the
preinterpretive data sufficiently “to count as an interpretation of it rather than
the invention of something new.”115 As Dworkin explains, any interpretation
that meets this threshold of fit qualifies as an acceptable candidate for the
best interpretation of the legal practice in question:
When an interpretation meets the threshold, remaining defects of fit may
be compensated, in [the interpreter’s] overall judgment, if the principles
of that interpretation are particularly attractive, because then he sets off
the community’s infrequent lapses in respecting these principles against
its virtue in generally observing them. The constraint fit imposes on
substance, in any working theory, is therefore the constraint of one type of
political conviction on another in the overall judgment which
obligations for participants that they would not otherwise have. The idea is to make moral sense
of the practice by showing people why and under what circumstances they might have reason
to comply with it.
Stephen R. Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, 4 LEGAL THEORY 427, 463 (1998).
112. DWORKIN, supra note 109, at 66.
113. Dworkin explains that “[c]onvictions about fit will provide a rough threshold requirement that
an interpretation of some part of the law must meet if it is to be eligible at all.” Id. at 255.
114. Id. at 66.
115. Id. at 67.
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interpretation makes a political record the best it can be overall, everything
taken into account.116

Given the near perfect level of fit between the personal sovereignty
interpretation and the ex ante doctrines, the case for the personal sovereignty
interpretation turns on whether it casts contract law overall in the best moral
light possible, despite its lack of fit with the ex post doctrines, compared to
the best available alternative interpretations. We argue that the personal
sovereignty interpretation provides the most compelling moral justification
available for the ex ante doctrines. In addition, because these doctrines
comprise the vast majority of contract law itself, we conclude that contract
law does not, in Dworkin’s terms, “really” include the ex post doctrines.
Instead, the personal sovereignty interpretation treats them as legal error. In
doing so, the personal sovereignty interpretation “sets off the [judicial]
community’s infrequent lapses in respecting” the value of personal
sovereignty in contract law “against its virtue in generally observing” it.117
Moreover, our historical account of the origins and persistence of the
ex post doctrines even casts the erroneous judicial practice of recognizing ex
post doctrine in its best moral light. It shows how judges applied ex post
doctrines out of a misguided respect for stare decisis and an understandable
failure to appreciate that the newly formed ex ante core of contract law
rendered the time-honored ex post norms of justice and fairness not merely
vacuous, but perversely unjust and unfair to impose. Thus, by treating the ex
post doctrines as legal error, the personal sovereignty interpretation renders
the remaining doctrines of contract law internally coherent, consistent, and
principled. It thereby meets the Dworkinian goal of constructing an
interpretation that best realizes the ideal of (contract) law as integrity.118
Dworkin’s theory of the correct interpretation of law, however, is
comparative. It identifies the right interpretation with the best interpretation.
The personal sovereignty interpretation of contract law is the right theory,
then, only if there isn’t a better one. The chief rival to the personal
sovereignty interpretation is pluralism. Pluralism claims that contract law
serves multiple, competing values. Unlike the personal sovereignty
interpretation, the pluralist interpretation fits both ex ante and ex post
116. Id. at 257.
117. Id.
118.
When a judge declares that a particular principle is instinct in law, he reports . . . an interpretive
proposal: that the principle both fits and justifies some complex part of legal practice, that it
provides an attractive way to see, in the structure of that practice, the consistency of principle
integrity requires.
Id. at 228. For Dworkin’s understanding of the relationship between interpretations of law generally, and
interpretations of particular “departments” of law, such as contract or tort law, see id. at 250–54.
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doctrines. Instead of treating the ex post doctrines as legal error, pluralism
explains them as just one among many kinds of doctrines vindicating
multiple values that compete with, and sometimes trump, personal
sovereignty. For pluralists, the purpose of contract law is to vindicate, and
resolve conflicts between, the many competing values at stake in contract
cases.119 Pluralists argue, therefore, that pluralism is superior to the personal
sovereignty interpretation because only pluralism “fits” with the judicial and
black letter practice of recognizing the ex post doctrines as legally valid.120
In the remainder of this Part, we address the relative merits of the
personal sovereignty and pluralist interpretations of contract law. We argue
in Section II.B that the personal sovereignty interpretation achieves a better
overall balance between the fit and moral light criteria than pluralism
achieves. In Section II.C we consider the doctrines that pluralists cite as
evidence that contract law vindicates multiple values rather than just the
value of personal sovereignty. We show that, with the exception of the ex
post doctrines, all of them vindicate personal sovereignty rather than some
other value. We then consider the ex post doctrines in Section II.D and argue
that they either vindicate no value at all, and perversely undermine justice
between the parties, or serve to promote either paternalism or antiopportunism. We conclude that neither paternalism nor anti-opportunism can
justify the existence of ex post doctrines, or the ex post perspective generally,
in contract law.
B. PLURALISM AND FIT
Pluralism’s superior fit with contract law does not provide a reason to
prefer it over the personal sovereignty interpretation. This is because
pluralism lacks the theoretical resources needed to identify as invalid one
among multiple doctrines that may comprise contract law. Given that courts
can and do make mistakes, one criterion of adequacy for explanatory legal
theories is that they can, at least in principle, determine that doctrines long
recognized as valid by legally authoritative sources are nonetheless
invalid.121 Because pluralism fails this test, it begs the question against the
119. See Eisenberg, supra note 37, and accompanying text (setting out the principal pluralist
claims).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 979 n.16 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“[F]or 40 years
Congress has insisted on retaining a voice on individual suspension cases—it has frequently rejected bills
which would place final authority in the Executive Branch.”); id. at 967 (“Today the Court not only
invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly
200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a ‘legislative veto.’ ”); id. at 1002 (“[This
decision] reflects a profoundly different conception of the Constitution than that held by the Courts which
sanctioned the modern administrative state. Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions
in more laws enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history.”).
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personal sovereignty interpretation, which concludes that the ex post
doctrines are legally invalid, despite their preinterpretive status as legally
valid contract doctrines.
Moreover, pluralism is incapable of determining whether the best
interpretation of an area of law should understand its purpose to be the
vindication of multiple values, or the vindication of only one value, even
though it erroneously includes some doctrines that vindicate other values.
Put simply, pluralism cannot designate any doctrine as anomalous. In the
end, pluralism makes the purely formal claim that an area of law vindicates
more than one value, but lacks the theoretical resources to reject doctrines as
invalid or to advance any substantive explanatory or normative claim beyond
its assertion that an area of law has a value headcount of greater than one.
C. REFUTING DOCTRINAL EVIDENCE OF PLURALISM: POLICING THE
BARGAIN AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
There is widespread agreement, even among pluralists, that the ex ante
perspective grounds many of the core doctrines of contract law. The law of
offer and acceptance,122 the basis of contract in promise,123 the objective
theory of intent,124 and the indefiniteness doctrine125 are just a few examples
of contract rules clearly designed to facilitate the making, interpretation, and
enforcement of agreements. Few would disagree that these and similar core
structural components of contract law serve to vindicate some conception of
individual autonomy. But contract law also contains a set of doctrines
designed to “police” the bargains that give rise to agreements. If a bargain
violates one of these doctrines, it might not be legally enforceable. These
include the doctrines of capacity,126 duress,127 fraud,128 mistake,129 and
procedural unconscionability. In this section, we explain why these doctrines
clearly vindicate personal sovereignty rather than some competing value.
1. Policing the Bargain
The capacity doctrine prevents enforcement of any agreement reached
with an individual who does not qualify as a morally responsible agent
because, for example, he or she is under the age of majority or mentally
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 18–70 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
See id. §§ 1–5.
See id. § 2.
See id. §§ 33–34.
See id. §§ 12–16.
See id. §§ 174–177.
See id. §§ 159–173.
See id. §§ 151–158.
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incapacitated.130 The duress doctrine prevents enforcement of any agreement
to which a party’s assent was not fully voluntary.131 The fraud doctrines,
such as intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, prevent
enforcement of any agreement induced by one party’s false assertions or
efforts to prevent the other from discovering material truths regarding the
subject matter of their agreement.132 The mistake doctrines prevent
enforcement of apparent agreements in which one or both parties failed to
understand the nature of the agreement, and so actually did not in fact reach
any agreement.133 Finally, procedural unconscionability expands beyond the
technical limits of the above doctrines to prevent enforcement of agreements
reached under conditions in which one party took unfair advantage of the
other. For example, it polices against actions taken for the sole purpose of
deliberately misleading, discouraging, or preventing the other from
discovering or understanding the true nature or value of their transaction.134
The classic case is a seller using a pre-printed, standard sales form that states
terms disadvantageous to the buyer in a smaller font than the other terms.135
Taken together, these doctrines erect a bulwark to ensure that contract law
respects the value of personal sovereignty by enforcing only agreements
reached by morally responsible individuals under free and fair conditions.
They certainly provide no support for the pluralist claim that contract law
vindicates values other than personal sovereignty.
2. Social Justice
Pluralists also cite another set of doctrines as evidence that contract law
vindicates values that compete with individual autonomy and thus with
personal sovereignty. These doctrines include illegality, immorality, and
public policy.136 For the most part, each of these doctrines vindicates values
that sound in what we have called social justice. In particular, they often
prevent the enforcement of agreements reached under free and fair
conditions that impose costs on third parties, or in the parlance of economics,
cause “negative externalities.” For example, by voiding contracts for an
illegal purpose, the illegality doctrine makes it more difficult for individuals
to commit crimes, and many criminal laws prohibit activities that wrongfully
harm others.137 To the extent that the illegality doctrine serves to prevent
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 74, at 464–80.
Id. at 403–20.
Id. at 420–64.
Id. at 691–725.
Id. at 501–14.
See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
For discussion, see SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 74, at 480–500.
See, e.g., Watts v. Malatesta, 186 N.E. 210 (N.Y. 1933).
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such crimes, it serves social justice so understood.138
Like the illegality and immorality doctrines, courts sometimes invoke
public policy to invalidate bargains that would offend basic notions of human
dignity, such as contracts for surrogacy, the sale of body parts, indentured
servitude, torture, and the like.139 Some have argued that the public policy
doctrine, when used as a ground to prohibit enforcement of such agreements,
reinforces the value of individual autonomy by respecting the inalienable
rights of autonomous individuals.140 Others have argued that respect for
individual autonomy is, in principle, incompatible with the legal prohibition
of these contracts because truly autonomous individuals are free to alienate
their own autonomy.141 The compatibility of the public policy doctrine with
respect for personal sovereignty thus turns on this debate over the
foundations and limits of individual autonomy. But as with the illegality and
immorality doctrines, the invalidation of such contracts can often be justified
again on the ground that doing so is necessary to prevent harm to others not
engaging in those activities (or because it is practically impossible to meet
the extremely high standard for ensuring that such agreements are truly
voluntary). The social “spillover effects” of these activities alone is likely to
incentivize sufficiently harmful activity to justify these prohibitions. In short,
138. If there are so-called victimless crimes, as is conceivable, for example, for certain instances of
prostitution, gambling, and suicide, then the illegality doctrine cannot be justified on the ground that it
prevents harm to others. Legal prohibition of victimless crimes constitutes a form of legal moralism,
which condones legislation that restricts individual liberty in order to vindicate a socially designated
conception of the good. If the public policy doctrine refuses to enforce agreements because they further
a purpose deemed immoral according to a designated social conception of the good, the doctrine is
incompatible with respect for individual autonomy. But often, the same activities can be prohibited on
the quite plausible ground that they are likely to cause widespread and serious harm to those not engaged
in those activities, as is likely true of the most common forms of prostitution, gambling, and suicide.
139. See generally In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). Some courts and commentators justify
invalidation of such contracts on the grounds of substantive unconscionability. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, cmt. c (“Theoretically it is possible for a contract to be oppressive taken
as a whole, even though there is no weakness in the bargaining process . . . .”); Gillman v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. 1988); see also Eisenberg, supra note 37.
140. The locus classicus for this position is JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 194–95 (Alburey
Castell ed., 1947) (“The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life,
is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case . . . [B]y selling himself for a slave, he abdicates
his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case,
the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself.”); see also David
Archard, Freedom Not to be Free: The Case of the Slavery Contract in J. S. Mill's on Liberty, 40 PHIL.
Q. 453 (1990); David Brink, Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political [https://perma.cc/ZAG2-ANKY] (“Mill thinks that
it is impermissible to contract into slavery and that paternalistic laws that prevent such contracts are not
only permissible but obligatory.” (citing MILL, supra)).
141. The most influential contemporary defense of this position is ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 331 (1974) (“The comparable question about an individual is whether a free system
will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I believe that it would.”). See generally David Ellerman,
Inalienable Rights: A Litmus Test for Liberal Theories of Justice, 29 LAW & PHIL. 571 (2010); J.
Philmore, The Libertarian Case For Slavery, 14 PHIL. F. 43 (1982).
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the illegality, immorality, and public policy doctrines are justified as
reasonably necessary to prevent social harm, and therefore are, at least to
that extent, fully compatible with respect for personal sovereignty.
In sum, a careful examination of the doctrines pluralists cite as evidence
that contract law pursues multiple purposes reveals that most of them
actually ensure that contract law respects both individual autonomy and
social justice. In our view, both of these kinds of doctrines support our claim
that contract law is exclusively devoted to vindicating personal sovereignty.
Obviously, the autonomy-respecting doctrines are fully compatible with the
personal sovereignty account of contract law. However, the doctrines that
serve social justice are also similarly harmonious with our claim that contract
law is devoted exclusively to vindicating personal sovereignty. The value of
personal sovereignty gives no license to engage in activities that create an
unacceptable, material risk of harm to others. To be sure, there are many
other areas of law that contain doctrines serving social justice, including tort
and criminal law. But the existence of contract law itself makes the contractspecific social justice doctrines necessary. Once the law of contract
committed to respecting individual autonomy fully by empowering
individuals to make legally enforceable agreements, social justice required
that contract law itself include doctrines to confine its mandate to the limits
of its own justification. The social justice contract doctrines, therefore, serve
as constitutive components of the personal sovereignty regime, policing the
boundaries of contract from within contract law itself.
D. REFUTING DOCTRINAL EVIDENCE OF PLURALISM: THE EX POST
DOCTRINES
Once the social justice contract doctrines are understood to be
compatible with, rather than inconsistent with, the personal sovereignty
interpretation of contract law, the case for pluralism rests entirely on the
existence of the ex post doctrines. Pluralists often cite the penalty rule, the
compensation principle, and the doctrines of forfeiture and excuse from
hardship as examples of contract doctrines that vindicate values that compete
with personal sovereignty.142 All of these doctrines claim to vindicate the
value of ex post justice, which pluralists claim can override the value of
personal sovereignty.
There is no doubt that courts and other legally authoritative sources
recognize these ex post doctrines, and these doctrines therefore qualify as
part of the legal data for which interpretations of contract law must account.
It is also clear that all of these doctrines originated long before the modern
142.

See supra notes 15–28 and accompanying text.
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transformation of American contract law, and that they served to police
against abuses arising out of the widespread use of penal bonds to structure
commercial transactions. In addition, it is equally clear that this rationale for
the ex post doctrines ceased to exist after the creation of contract law’s
extensive doctrinal apparatus for interpreting and enforcing executory
agreements, which obviated the need for penal bonds. The question, then, is
whether these doctrines have been judicially adapted to serve another valid
purpose.
1. The Ex Post Doctrines and Social Justice
Given that the ex post doctrines invite courts to vitiate the ex ante intent
of the parties, it is natural to wonder whether they are actually part of contract
law’s social justice doctrines. After all, social justice doctrines also serve to
limit enforcement of agreements reached under free and fair conditions. But
the common denominator among the ex post doctrines is that they are
grounded solely in a concern to ensure what we have called “individual
justice,” or justice and fairness between the parties. None purports to upset
the parties’ intent in order to prevent harm to others. The compensation
principle, the penalty doctrine, and the forfeiture doctrine claim to prevent
an injustice or unfairness to one of the parties that would result from
enforcement, not to prevent a social harm.
Recall that a liquidated damages clause substantially in excess of (ex
post) compensatory damages is treated as an unjust and unfair penalty to the
breacher, and an unjust and unfair windfall to the non-breacher.143 Likewise,
in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,144 an interpretation construing the owner’s
obligation to pay the last progress payment as conditional on the builder’s
perfect completion of the house is taken to impose an unjust and unfair
forfeiture on the builder who tenders an imperfect house, and to confer an
unjust and unfair windfall on the owner.145 These doctrines base their
findings of injustice and unfairness on a normative evaluation of the
distribution of gains and losses at the time of breach that would result from
enforcing the ex ante agreement. According to this evaluation, a
disproportionate distribution of gains and losses are taken to offend ex post
principles of justice and fairness. The value served by the ex post contract
doctrines, therefore, is certainly not a species of social justice. Instead, the
ex post doctrines purport to be a species of individual justice, which
143. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
144. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). For a critique of the conventional
framing in the Jacob & Youngs case as constituting an unjust forfeiture for the homeowner and a windfall
for the builder, see Kraus & Scott, supra note 83, at 1095–97; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 8.
145. See supra note 27.
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addresses the claims available to the parties for objecting to the effects on
them of enforcing their own agreement.
2. The Ex Post Doctrines and Individual Justice: The Ex Post Fallacy
No one disputes that enforcement of an agreement is individually just
only if it was reached under free and fair conditions, and that the ex ante
doctrines discussed above ensure that contract law enforces only these
agreements. The ex post doctrines, however, imply that the ex ante doctrines
set out the necessary but not sufficient conditions for securing individual
justice. The ex post doctrines presuppose that individual justice has two
prongs: the ex ante and the ex post. Thus, an agreement can be individually
just when reached (because it was reached under free and fair conditions) but
individually unjust to enforce at the time of adjudication, in light of events
that occurred only after formation of the agreement. As the above examples
demonstrate, the ex post doctrines are premised on the possibility that parties
can consent under free and fair conditions to an agreement that turns out to
violate the compensatory and proportionality criteria for justice and fairness
at the time of adjudication.
In our view, this two-prong understanding of individual justice is based
on a conceptual confusion, which we call the ex post fallacy. This fallacy
consists of the belief that the allocation of gains and losses between the
parties that would result from enforcement at the time of adjudication is
relevant to the individual justice and fairness of enforcing their agreement.
The fallacy derives from the ubiquitous judicial practice of determining
liability from the ex ante perspective but determining remedy from the ex
post perspective. The common law has for centuries understood the justice
and fairness of a remedy to be logically independent of the theory of legal
liability. Thus, the legal remedy to which a plaintiff is entitled never turns on
why the defendant was found legally responsible for causing harm to the
plaintiff. For example, the remedy to which a plaintiff is entitled is the same
whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a defendant’s negligent driving,
libelous slander, or physical trespass. In every case, once the court
determines that the defendant is liable, the ground for liability has no bearing
on the remedy it imposes. The remedial objective in all cases is to restore the
plaintiff to the position it was in before it suffered the harm caused by the
defendant. A remedy is just and fair, using this approach, if and only if it
requires the defendant to pay no more or less than is necessary to compensate
the plaintiff for loss the defendant wrongfully caused.
Unsurprisingly, courts accustomed to this intuitive and sound remedial
framework for all common law claims prior to the transformation of
American contract law have been inclined to take the same approach in
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modern contract cases. They have presumed that the remedy to which a
plaintiff is entitled is the same for harms caused by the defendant’s breach
of contract as it is for harms caused by any other conduct for which the
defendant is legally responsible, such as negligent conduct in tort or trespass
in property. But unlike defendants who cause harm to plaintiffs through their
negligence or trespass, defendants who cause harm to plaintiffs by breaching
an agreement have always had the prior opportunity, when contemplating
the possibility of breach, to agree with the plaintiff on the consequences to
the defendant in the event of breach.146 Indeed, if the defendant paid the
plaintiff in advance to agree that the plaintiff would be entitled to only half
of any harm caused by the defendant’s breach, a remedy requiring the
defendant pay the full harm caused by its breach would be unjust and unfair
to both parties. It would be unjust and unfair to the defendant because it
already paid to transfer the risk of half of any loss from breach to the plaintiff.
And it would be unjust and unfair to allow the plaintiff both to receive a
payment for assuming the risk of half the loss of any breach, and yet also to
be reimbursed for the entire loss caused by breach.147
146. The ability of contracting parties to determine the remedy for breach ex ante, unlike tort
victims, was forcefully made by Justice Holmes in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S.
540, 543 (1903) (“When a man commits a tort, he incurs, by force of the law, a liability to damages,
measured by certain rules. When a man makes a contract, he incurs, by force of the law, a liability to
damages, unless a certain promised event comes to pass. But, unlike the case of torts, as the contract is
by mutual consent, the parties themselves, expressly or by implication, fix the rule by which the damages
are to be measured . . . . It is true that, as people when contracting contemplate performance, not breach,
they commonly say little or nothing as to what shall happen in the latter event, and the common rules
have been worked out by common sense, which has established what the parties probably would have
said if they had spoken about the matter.” (emphasis added)).
147. Seana Shiffrin rejects the view that the common law bar against under or over-compensatory
liquidated damage clauses should be viewed “as an anomalous historical remnant.” Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: The Overprivatization of Private Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 412 (2016).
She justifies the bar on the ground that it prevents contracting parties from “tread[ing] upon the traditional
domain of the judiciary and on significant values associated with the rule of law. These other
considerations should supersede appeals to the efficiency of the contracting relation and the ex ante
agreements of the parties.” Id. at 413. According to Shiffrin, “values served by having the judiciary
independently assess and mete out remedies,” as well as the need “to protect the reputation and the
integrity of the judiciary as an impartial institution,” override the value of respecting the parties’ personal
sovereignty by enforcing their ex ante remedial agreements. Id. at 421–22.
“[W]hen remedial clauses are at issue, the judiciary’s role goes beyond that of protecting and
facilitating autonomous agreements. If a remedial clause is at issue, then we have an abrogation
of a legal duty, which implicates the rule of law, independent of the underlying purposes of the
contract law. The parties’ own autonomy interests . . . [do] not suggest a reason to think that
determining the public response to an abrogation of a legal duty also falls under their private
control.”
Id. at 435.
But the historical period during which the remediation for common law wrongs was the
traditional domain of the judiciary almost entirely precedes the rise of executory contracts and the
transformation of American contract law. Our claim is that Shiffrin’s argument—extending into the
domain of modern American contract law the traditional common law conception of remedy as the
exclusive province of the judiciary—exceeds its original rationale. Whereas the judicial determination of
common law wrongs outside of modern American contract law still makes sense, there is no justification
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Thus, in non-contract cases, although the ex ante perspective governs
liability, only the ex post perspective governs remedy. But in contract cases,
the agreement changes everything: the ex ante perspective governs the
justice and fairness of both liability and remedy. Judicial recourse to the ex
post perspective at the remedial phase of a contracts case is an
understandable but mistaken instinct borne of the longstanding practice of
determining remedies from the ex post perspective in all common law cases,
a practice that pre-dates the transformation of American contract law. But
the use of the ex post perspective to determine remedies for breach of
contract under the modern law of contracts perversely undermines the goal
of treating the parties justly and fairly. The ex post fallacy, then, is a product
of the (understandable) failure of common law courts to appreciate the
anachronism of the ex post perspective in modern contract law adjudication.
Unfortunately, the ex post fallacy has led some courts to conform to a
proportionality standard in the distribution of contractual gains and losses at
the time of adjudication despite the parties’ ex ante contractual allocation of
risks.148 The ex post fallacy has led to the assumption that disputes should
be resolved, when possible, in order to avoid disproportionate gains and
losses, even if the dispute is governed by an agreement in which both parties
freely and fairly agreed to take the risk of precisely such an outcome.149 To
be sure, these courts do not abrogate contractual terms outright in order to
ensure conformity with an ex post proportionality standard. Rather, relying
on doctrines governing forfeiture and excuse from hardship,150 they typically
distort their interpretation of terms to avoid such outcomes, often by arguing
that, despite clear language indicating otherwise, parties would not have
agreed to such an unfairly disproportionate outcome.151 But if individual
justice requires respect for the parties’ freely and fairly chosen contract
terms, and these terms allocate the risk of a disproportionate outcome to a
given party, then the resolution of a dispute according to those terms is not
unjust to that party, even if it imposes on him the lion’s share of the
contractual losses.
In short, the ex post fallacy tempts courts to beg the question by
for overriding the parties’ ex ante intent when they agree in their contract on the consequences of breach.
Shiffrin’s justification—the need for courts to ensure the just remediation of wrongs—begs the question
by presuming that enforcement of remedial clauses (to which the parties agreed under free and fair
conditions) sometimes conflicts with the requirements of remedial justice. Her view rests, therefore, on
the assumption that individual justice sometimes turns on ex post considerations. Our claim, however, is
that there is no defensible ex post conception of individual justice.
148. See infra notes 222–25 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 209–10 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 211–25 and accompanying text.
151. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
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claiming that because disproportionate outcomes are necessarily unjust and
unfair, they should presume that parties bargaining under fair conditions
would not have agreed to take the risk of such an unjust outcome.152 But
there is no reason to reject disproportionate outcomes of contracts formed
under free and fair conditions as necessarily individually unjust and unfair.
The justice and fairness of all contractual outcomes depend on the free and
fair allocation of risks specified by the contract’s terms, not any objective
characteristics of the distribution of gains and losses at the time of
adjudication.
3. Ex Post Doctrines and Paternalism
Individual justice does not turn on the relative distribution of gains and
losses at the time of adjudication. It might turn, however, on the sheer
magnitude of the harm that one party suffers as a result of a disproportionate
outcome. Pluralists have claimed that by endorsing and applying ex post
doctrines, courts are vindicating a paternalistic conception of individual
good that licenses courts to override individual autonomy under the
conditions provided for by the ex post doctrines.153 On this view, individual
justice requires respect for both individual autonomy and an individual’s
good, and contract law has doctrines that vindicate both. But whether such a
view of contract law is coherent depends on the conceptions of individual
autonomy and paternalism that contract law is taken to embrace. Joel
Feinberg describes a “compromise” between autonomy and an individual’s
own good that could coherently vindicate both values:
[A] person’s own good in the vast majority of cases will be most reliably
furthered if he is allowed to make his own choices in self-regarding
matters, but when self-interest and self-determination do not coincide, one
[could] simply do one’s best to balance autonomy against personal wellbeing, and decide between them intuitively, since neither has automatic
priority over the other.154
152. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 69 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(holding that Alcoa’s failure to include a term reducing the risk of a wide disparity between contract and
market prices “can only be understood to imply that the parties deemed the risk too remote and their
meaning too clear to trifle with additional negotiation and drafting”); see also infra notes 212–26 and
accompanying text.
153. As an example of such a claim, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the
Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) (justifying the penalty rule and other ex post doctrines
on the grounds of individuals’ propensity to err).
154. FEINBERG, supra note 11, at 59–60. Feinberg describes three other possible relationships
between autonomy and paternalism, but none of them are open to the pluralist that claims contract law
endorses the conception of autonomy vindicated by the ex ante doctrines as well as a conception of
paternalism strong enough to account for the ex post doctrines’ capacity to override the ex ante doctrines.
The first renders the right of self-determination “entirely derivative and instrumental. On this view, we
may exercise a right to self-determination only because, and only insofar as, it promotes our good to do
so.” Id. at 58. We presume that even the pluralist concedes that such a weak and empty conception of
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The problem with this compromise position is that it must interpret the
ex ante contract doctrines as vindicating a relatively weak conception of
individual autonomy, compared to the personal sovereignty conception, and
by doing so casts contract law in a less compelling moral light than the
personal sovereignty interpretation. Feinberg explains that the personal
sovereignty conception rejects this compromise because it “follows from a
pure conception of individual sovereign autonomy, and anyone who holds
such a conception, tacitly or explicitly, can find no appeal in—indeed is
logically precluded from embracing—legal paternalism.”155 Thus, the
compromise position “will not satisfy the liberal adherent of personal
sovereignty since it restricts individual authority to some degree even in the
wholly self-regarding domain. . . . [It] allows room for personal autonomy
but does not conceive of it on the model of territorial sovereignty, since it
permits it to be balanced against other considerations, and thereby deprives
it of its trumping effect.”156
We believe that contract law’s ex ante doctrines are most plausibly
interpreted as vindicating an “underivative sovereign right of selfdetermination,”157 one which “accords uniquely with a self-conception
deeply imbedded in the moral attitudes of most people.”158 The pluralist who
endorses the paternalistic interpretation of the ex post doctrines must insist
on an interpretation of the ex ante contract doctrines that reject this powerful
conception of individual autonomy in favor of one that allows a court to
subordinate an individual’s own freely and fairly made choices to a court’s
judgment of what would best serve that individual’s interests. American
contract law, in our view, definitively rejects this view. We think Feinberg
accurately captures the spirit of the modern American common law of
individual autonomy cannot account for the breadth and depth of the express reasoning and application
of the ex ante contract doctrines. The second takes the right of self-determination always to override
concerns for an individual’s personal good (because overriding self-determination, as an empirical matter,
will always be self-defeating given the psychological costs on doing so on the individual whose selfdetermination is undermined). Id. at 59. This conception is obviously too strong for the pluralist, who
insists that the ex post doctrines sometimes justify the overriding of ex ante intent, and thereby defeating
the parties’ efforts at self-determination. The third version is the personal sovereignty conception, which
gives no quarter to paternalism even in principle, and so, like the second version, cannot account for the
capacity of ex post doctrines to override the parties’ intent. (“[This interpretation] that follows from a
pure conception of individual sovereign autonomy, and anyone who holds such a conception . . . can find
no appeal in—indeed is logically precluded from embracing—legal paternalism.”). Id. at 59.
155. Id. at 59, 61 (“[A] person’s right of self-determination, being sovereign, takes precedence even
over his own good. Interference in these cases is justified only when necessary to determine whether his
choice is voluntary, hence truly his, or to protect him from choices that are not truly his; but interference
with his informed and genuine choices is not justified to protect him from unwisely incurred or risked
harms. He has a sovereign right to choose in a manner we think, plausibly enough, to be foolish, provided
only that the choices are truly voluntary.”).
156. Id. at 60.
157. Id. at 61.
158. Id. at 61–62.
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contract when he summarizes the conviction inherent in the personal
sovereignty conception of individual autonomy:
Even in the cases where the person subsequently regrets his choice, he
may not regret that he had not been forcibly prevented from making it.
There must be a right to err, to be mistaken, to decide foolishly, to take
big risks, if there is to be any meaningful self-rule; without it, the whole
idea of de jure autonomy begins to unravel.159

The paternalistic interpretation of the value underlying the ex post
contract doctrines requires the pluralist to deprive the vast majority of
contract doctrines of their most powerful and intuitive moral justification—
the vindication of not merely any conception of individual autonomy, but of
personal sovereignty. Given that the ex post doctrines comprise a small
percentage of contract doctrine, and are directly applied only infrequently in
litigation, this pluralist interpretation comes at too high a cost on the
Dworkinian balance between the criteria of fit and best moral light. The
personal sovereignty interpretation casts contract law in a far better moral
light than this pluralist interpretation and more than compensates, in our
view, for the relative sacrifice in fit required by treating ex post doctrines as
understandable legal error rather than valid components of contract law.
4. Ex Post Doctrines and Opportunism
The scholarly support for equity in general, and in contract law in
particular, has experienced a gradual renaissance over the last several
decades.160 Rather than grounding equity, and contract law’s ex post
doctrines, in paternalism, these scholars claim these doctrines serve the
purpose of preventing opportunism.161 Proponents of the anti-opportunism
rationale for the ex post contract doctrines define “opportunism” in the
contractual setting as
159. Id. at 62. Feinberg defines “de jure” autonomy as “the sovereign right of self-government” and
contrasts it with “de facto” autonomy, which he defines as “the actual condition of self-government.” Id.
at 65.
160. See, e.g., Ayotte, Friedman, & Smith, supra note 38; Cohen, supra note 38; Juliet P. Kostritsky,
Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule
for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43 (2007); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of
Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981). On equity more generally, see also Henry E. Smith, Equitable
Defences as Meta-Law, in DEFENCES IN EQUITY 17 (Paul S. Davies, Simon Douglas & James Goudkamp
eds., 2018); Henry E. Smith, Fusing the Equitable Function in Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 173 (Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather & Ross Grantham eds., 2017); Yuval Feldman & Henry
E. Smith, Behavioral Equity, 170 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 137 (2014).
161. Unfortunately, the key concept of “opportunism” is notoriously difficult to define. Oliver
Williamson, the father of the concept, defined it vaguely as “self-interest seeking with guile.” OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL
CONTRACTING 47 (1985).
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a special case . . . that gets past other devices for dealing with it.
Opportunism in general appears to contain an element of deceit because
the opportunist takes unanticipated or unintended advantage of the law to
the detriment of others . . . In the contractual context, its unanticipated or
unintended nature takes the behavior out of the shared contemplation of
the parties, but perhaps not out of the plans of the opportunist . . . . [T]he
opportunist takes advantage of unusual knowledge about gaps in the
contract or in the law. So opportunism is using the law (or contract) in a
way that it is not intended, and can at most be anticipated in a general (and
behavior-distorting) sense.162

Our present inquiry is whether anti-opportunism provides a rationale
for the ex post doctrines that leaves the pluralist in a stronger position than
did their paternalist rationale. The anti-opportunism rationale does, in fact,
purport to reconcile the ex post doctrines with respect for personal
sovereignty. Scholars defending the “safety valve model of equity” argue
that equity “has a role even in an area of law as centered on party autonomy
and intent as contracts.”163 They claim that “opportunists are operating
outside of the domain of what was actually contracted about.”164 No matter
what contractual measures the parties might have taken to anticipate and
prevent opportunism, those measures hold “only over the domain over which
the parties contract, or, more accurately over the domain over which the
parties can be expected to contract cost-effectively.”165
The idea that contract terms are domain-specific is, in fact, the explicit
premise of ex post doctrines, such as mutual mistake, commercial
impracticability, and frustration of performance. As the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts defines them, each of these grounds of excuse from
hardship is predicated on the possibility that
[a]n extraordinary circumstance may make performance so vitally
different from what was reasonably to be expected as to alter the essential
nature of that performance. In such a case the court must determine
whether justice requires a departure from the general rule that the obligor
bear the risk that the contract may become more burdensome or less
desirable. . . . [T]he central inquiry is whether the non-occurrence of the
circumstance was a ‘basic assumption on which the contract was
made.’”166
162. Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 38, at 25. George Cohen provides an alternative
definition of “opportunism” in the contract setting as “any contractual conduct by one party contrary to
the other party’s reasonable expectations based on the parties’ agreement, contractual norms, or
conventional morality.” Cohen, supra note 38, at 957.
163. Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 38, at 29.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 30.
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis
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According to the “basic assumption” requirement, the ex post doctrines
would apply only in circumstances that the parties failed to anticipate, or
anticipated but failed to address, in their contract. Thus, rather than vitiating
the parties’ intent, they serve to fill gaps not covered by the parties’ intent.
The key to the anti-opportunism rationale, therefore, is that
opportunistic behavior always qualifies as a failure of a basic assumption,
and any intervention to address a failure of a basic assumption cannot
possibly violate personal sovereignty.167 As proponents of this defense have
defined it, opportunistic behavior is necessarily impossible to anticipate and
cost-effectively address in advance. Therefore, when it occurs, it is
necessarily beyond the scope of the parties’ agreement and constitutes a
failure of a basic assumption. Ex post equitable intervention under such
circumstances therefore never vitiates the parties’ consent but rather fills
gaps not covered by the contract.
The anti-opportunism defense of ex post doctrines, therefore, provides
a better interpretation of contract law only if the basic assumption
requirement makes them consistent with respect for personal sovereignty. It
does not. It is true that there will always be some circumstances beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time of formation. It does not, however,
follow from this truism that the parties cannot agree on whether their terms
will control such circumstances anyway, no matter what the result. Indeed,
every contracting party knows that there are circumstances beyond their
contemplation that may upset their expectations. To be sure, it is possible
that parties will prefer to limit the application of their agreement to the
circumstances within their contemplation and license a court to resolve
disputes arising under any other circumstances.168 But it is also possible that
parties will agree that their terms should apply even in circumstances that are
beyond their contemplation. In such cases, although the parties by definition
did not foresee the circumstances that have materialized, they foresaw the
possibility that unforeseeable circumstances might materialize and agreed
that their terms should nevertheless govern such cases.169
added).
167. “[C]ombating opportunism has to be at least in part judicial because of the open-endedness of
opportunism. The ability of a better informed party to engage in opportunism is hard to bound:
opportunism might occur on as yet unknown and undefined margins.” Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra
note 38, at 28.
168. Indeed, if most parties have this preference, contract law should have a default rule that implies
a term licensing such intervention in every contract.
169. George Triantis has challenged the assumption that contracting parties are unable rationally to
manage and allocate risks of unanticipated events:
While an unknown risk cannot be priced and allocated specifically, it can be priced and
allocated as part of the package of a more broadly framed risk. For example, consider a party
who agrees to transport a shipment of goods for a fixed fee. The risk of a nuclear accident in
the Middle East that causes a dramatic decrease in the production of oil and a consequent
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The ex post doctrines, however, do not confine ex post judicial
intervention to contracts in which the parties explicitly or implicitly
subjected their agreements to judicial intervention when unanticipated
circumstances materialize. Instead, they subject every contract to such
review, irrespective of whether parties have explicitly disavowed their
consent to such intervention.170 The idea that every contract is necessarily
intended to be subject to a basic assumption inquiry is false. Parties can and
do anticipate that there may be unanticipated circumstances, and yet provide
that their contract applies to such circumstances. When they do, and the ex
post doctrines nonetheless license courts to override the parties’ intent
anyway, they violate the parties’ personal sovereignty.
5. Summary
The personal sovereignty interpretation of contract law provides a more
morally compelling justification for the ex ante doctrines, and therefore casts
contract law in a better moral light, than pluralist interpretations that
recognize the ex post doctrines as valid and ground them in either
paternalism or anti-opportunism. In the end, both purported justifications for
the ex post doctrines render them fundamentally incompatible with respect
for personal sovereignty and thus require the pluralist interpretation to
ground the ex ante doctrines on a conception of individual autonomy that is
morally less compelling than personal sovereignty. In our view, the personal
sovereignty interpretation is justified in treating the ex post doctrines as legal
error in order to cast the vast majority of contract law in the best moral light
possible. Moreover, by explaining the seductive appeal of the ex post fallacy
that separates liability and remedy, the personal sovereignty interpretation
casts this sustained judicial error in a historically understandable and
psychologically plausible light as well.
increase in its price might not be foreseen. As a result, this risk cannot be allocated explicitly
in the contract. However, the broader risk of a large increase in the price of oil for any reason
can be. Therefore, there is no gap to be filled by the doctrine of impracticability: the risk of
nuclear accident, though unforeseen, is allocated implicitly. Instead, the doctrine alters the
contractual allocation of the risk and its proponents must advance a rationale for the
reallocation.
George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450, 452 (1992).
170. The anti-opportunist argument for equity explicitly contemplates that the ex post doctrines
should apply even if the parties expressly reject them:
The ability of a better informed party to engage in opportunism is hard to bound: opportunism
might occur on as yet unknown and undefined margins. It is not enough to say that contract law
will supply defaults for incomplete contracts or that problems can be left to renegotiation. The
problem is that widening the contractual domain (the state space it covers) might lead to the
opposite from what one of the parties expected. Although our model provides a reason to think
that equity should be a strong default, these considerations of uncertainty point to how the
model might be extended to provide a rationale for mandatory equity in some circumstances.
Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 38, at 28 (emphasis added).
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III. THE HARMS OF THE EX POST PERSPECTIVE
As we showed in Part I, the penalty rule, the just compensation
principle, and the rules ranging from forfeiture to excuse from hardship are
vestiges of the centuries-long tradition of policing penal bonds, a tradition
begun at equity and transplanted into the common law. While few
contemporary cases invoke these doctrines directly, they cast a long shadow
over the ability of contracting parties to implement their ex ante intentions.
The ex post fallacy continues to influence common law judges and the
insistence on separating liability and remedy in contract application provides
prominent exemplars to support the claim of pluralist scholars that ex post
fairness properly remains a doctrinal constraint on ex ante contracting. In
contrast, as we argued in Part II, the personal sovereignty explanation of
American contract law justifies the rejection of the ex post doctrines as legal
error. In this Part, we explain how these lingering errors gratuitously increase
the difficulties parties face in achieving their ex ante goals and thereby
undermine personal sovereignty. We then illustrate how the presence of
erroneous doctrine has cultivated a judicial receptivity to the ex post
perspective more generally, fostering a judicial reluctance to apply ex ante
doctrines rigorously and predictably.
A. CONTEMPORARY LIMITATIONS ON CONTRACT REMEDIES
We have seen that American contract law endorses a “just
compensation principle” that provides a mandatory rule of compensatory
damages for breach of contract.171 Parties can attempt to opt out of courtdetermined compensatory damages by indicating the amount to which a nonbreacher will be entitled in the event of a breach, but contract doctrine
constrains their choice of an appropriate liquidated or limited damage clause.
The doctrine of unconscionability places a process constraint on the lower
bound of limited damages,172 and the penalty doctrine imposes a hard, upper
bound on supra-compensatory liquidated damages.173 Thus, under black171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (“The purposes of awarding contract
damages is to compensate the injured party.”); id. at ch. 16, topic 2, intro. note (“The initial assumption
is that the injured party is entitled to full compensation for his actual loss.”); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 329 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (“Where a right of action for breach exists, compensatory
damages will be given for the net amount of the losses caused and gains prevented by the defendant’s
breach . . . if established in accordance with the rules stated in §§ 330–346.”); see also U.C.C. § 1-305(a)
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (“The remedies provided by the Uniform Commercial
Code must be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed but neither consequential or special damages nor penal damages
may be had except as specifically provided in [the Code] . . . .”).
172. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-718 cmt. 1 (“An unreasonably small amount [in liquidated
damages] . . . might be stricken under the section on unconscionable contracts or clauses.”).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. e (“Some types of terms are not enforced,
regardless of context; examples are provisions for unreasonably large liquidated damages . . . .”); id.
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letter contract doctrine, courts will not enforce any liquidated or limited
damage clause that does not fall within the range of “compensatory
damages.”174 By limiting the range of party freedom to choose the remedial
duties triggered by breach, the mandatory liquidated and limited damages
rules undermine contracting parties’ ability to choose terms that maximize
the expected value of their contracts.175
American courts have partially mitigated the effects of these autonomylimiting doctrines by permitting parties to end-run the penalty doctrine’s
constraints. In Section III.A.1, we show how common law courts have
sought to cabin the just compensation principle by enforcing contractual
arrangements that are clearly designed to subject a breaching party to both
under-compensatory and supra-compensatory damages, provided those
arrangements violate only the spirit, but not the letter, of the penalty rule.
Nonetheless, as we show more fully in Section III.A.2, there is little question
that the penalty doctrine and its companion, the mandatory just
compensation principle, impair the parties’ ex ante choices of how to allocate
risks.
1. Common Law Courts Require Parties to Work Around the Penalty Rule
The judicial instinct to police extortionate and fraudulently enforced
penal bonds was far too ingrained by the beginning of the nineteenth century
for common law courts simply to set it aside to accommodate the contractual
innovations attending the industrial revolution.176 Instead, they left those
doctrines intact but over time allowed parties to contract around them. Wellknown and time-honored drafting techniques now allow parties to include
some enforceable remedial schemes that are under—or over—
compensatory.177
One method of escaping the penalty rule is to frame remedial provisions
as substantive terms of the contract rather than as the consequences of a
contract breach. Damages, after all, are only a subset of the available choices
the law gives parties to choose how and whether to terminate the contract,
choices that give the promisor control over the extent of the remedial
§ 355 cmt. a (“[C]ourts in contract cases do not award damages to punish the party in breach or to serve
as an example to others unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive
damages are recoverable.”).
174. See, e.g., id. § 356; U.C.C. § 2-718.
175. Scott & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1429.
176. See, e.g., Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123, 133 (1858) (adopting the principle of “just
compensation for the loss or injury actually sustained” (emphasis omitted)).
177. See, e.g., Cal. & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986)
(enforcing a clause providing that “if ‘Delivery of the Vessel’ was not made on ‘the Delivery Date’ of
June 30, 1981, Sun would pay C and H ‘as per-day liquidated damages and not as a penalty,’ . . . ‘a
reasonable measure of the damages’ [of] $17,000 per day”).
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commitment embedded in its promise. Termination provisions grant the
promisor the option to terminate the contract by incurring a cost that is
unrelated to compensation.178 Similarly, parties may frame remedial
provisions as substantive terms such as the right to cancel upon payment of
a fee or loss of a deposit.179 Buyers often agree to make over-compensatory
payments: they pay cancellation fees for walking away from airline tickets
or hotel reservations even when the seller resells their seats or rooms. Parties
may also escape the compensation principle by agreeing to an explicit
option180 or to alternative methods of contract performance rather than
providing for a primary obligation to perform and a secondary obligation to
pay damages.181
This array of doctrinal work-arounds reflects the implicit judicial
understanding that the penalty doctrine is at war with the animating purpose
of contract law. If courts fully supported not just the letter, but the spirit, of
the penalty doctrine, they would not tolerate, let alone facilitate, termination
clauses and other contractual devices that, in effect, allow the parties to
circumvent the purpose of that rule. Yet the longevity of the precedents
creating the doctrine have thus far prevented courts from simply dismissing
it as a holdover from a by-gone era that undermines parties’ contractual
intent. That tradition of well-established doctrine continues to constrain the
doctrinal options facing common law courts and has provided a prominent
exemplar to support the claim of pluralist scholars that ex post fairness
remains a doctrinal constraint on ex ante contracting.182
178. Scott & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1454.
179. Buyers of goods can often return goods and cancel the contract for free with no questions asked
or upon the payment of a small fee. An example is the electronics store that sells television sets for $1,000
and offers full refunds for any returns made within thirty days. This contract makes no effort to
compensate the seller for losses suffered when the buyer walks away from the exchange. Id. at 1430–31.
180. See generally Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 VA. L. REV. 2187,
2200 (2004) (“Structuring a contract as an option can also help the parties evade the penalty
doctrine . . . .”).
181. Many options are categorized doctrinally as alternative contracts. Traditional analysis has
distinguished the alternative provision designed to secure performance of the primary promise (a
liquidated damage clause) from two promised alternatives between which the promisor can choose, each
an agreed exchange for the consideration given by the promisee (an option). RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 339 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1932); see also, e.g., Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 511 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Cal. 1973) (recognizing “validity of provisions varying the acceptable
performance under a contract upon the happening of a contingency”).
182. See, for example, Melvin Eisenberg’s paternalist justification of the penalty rule on the ground,
inter alia, that it prevents parties subject to various cognitive errors from binding themselves to supracompensatory damages. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 1743, 1779–86 (2000).
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2. The Compensation Principle Undermines Ex Ante Intent
We have shown how common law courts have enforced substantive
terms that enable parties to avoid many of the constraints of the penalty rule
and the just compensation principle. But these measures are costly and
largely fail to protect liquidated damages agreements that fail to satisfy the
penalty rule. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.183 provides a salient
example of the problem facing contracting parties. By striking down a “take
or pay” clause that had been carefully negotiated between sophisticated
parties, the court deprived a commercial seller of an important contractual
protection against moral hazard risk that was paid for in the ex ante
contract.184 Moreover, the costs of a mandatory rule of just compensation
extend beyond cases, like Lake River, which strike down freely negotiated
liquidated damages agreements.185 Individuals bargain at their peril to
protect personal, sentimental, or idiosyncratic value in their contracts. Cases
such as Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.186 illustrate how the just
compensation principle is used to deny recovery unjustly to injured parties,
and the deterrent effect of these decisions continues to prevent others from
protecting important values in their contracts.187
The mandatory just compensation principle has other pernicious effects.
As we explained in Part II, the ex post fallacy has led some courts to conform
to a proportionality standard in the distribution of contractual gains and
losses that ignores the ex ante contractual allocation of risks. Courts have
denied recovery of actual losses in a number of cases in which the fear of
overcompensation caused them to overturn fairly negotiated agreements
designed to enhance the expected value of the contract. Consider the choice
between market damages and lost profits in breached contracts for the sale
of goods traded in well-developed markets. Here, common law courts have
long held that market damages—the difference between contract price and
market price—is the proper default measure of recovery.188 In some cases,
183.
184.

Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
In questioning the continued validity of the penalty doctrine, the court stated that
[T]he parties . . . will, in deciding whether to include a penalty clause in their contract,
weigh the gains against the costs . . . and will include the clause only if the benefits
exceed those costs as well as all other costs. On this view, the refusal to enforce penalty
clauses is (at best) paternalistic—and it seems odd that courts should display parental
solicitude for large corporations.
Id. at 1289.
185. See, e.g., Rye v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.E.2d 458 (N.Y. 1974); Fisher v. Schmeling,
520 N.W.2d 820 (N.D. 1994).
186. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Peevyhouse in 1994 in a case with substantially identical facts,
Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1994).
187. See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-708(1), 2-713 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); see
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however, had the seller delivered the goods and the buyer accepted them, the
injured party would not have derived its economic gain from the fluctuations
in market value. In these cases, courts have too often limited the injured party
to its ex post lost profits rather than apply the ex ante market damages
default.
Such was the case in Nobs Chemical, U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co.,189
where the court limited the plaintiff seller to its ninety-five thousand dollars
guaranteed profit and denied recovery of the three hundred thousand dollars
market price differential on the ground that market damages would
overcompensate the seller.190 The concern that this damage measure may
undercompensate mirrors the concern that market damages may
overcompensate. Thus, market damages are often thought (incorrectly) to
deny a volume seller full recovery for the loss of a sale that cannot be
replaced by reselling the goods to another buyer on the market.191 In both of
these circumstances, courts that substitute lost profits for market damages
fail to appreciate that damage rules are contract terms that allocate risks
between the parties differently. Lost profit damages reflect an ex post
perspective. They measure the value of the completed contract based on what
the parties actually did. Market damages, on the other hand, apply a measure
of events extrinsic to the parties’ behavior. Before a court applies a damage
measure, therefore, it must first decide how the parties expressly or by
implication allocated the relevant market risks. The question, therefore, is
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 8, at 611–12.
189. Nobs Chemical, U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980).
190. Id. at 214, 217. Other courts have followed the ex post reasoning in Nobs Chemical. See, e.g.,
H-W-H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder, 767 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1985); Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592
F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1979); Union Carbide Corp. v. Consumers Power Co., 636 F. Supp. 1498 (E.D. Mich.
1986). But see Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d 471 (Kan. 1992) (compensation principle does not trump
market damages simply because contract-market differential exceeds promisee’s economic loss).
191.
The critiques of the lost volume seller cases are many. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Case for
Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155 (1990). Scott and Triantis
argue that the debate over lost volume damages has missed the important point that parties can (and do)
choose among contract terms that will provide the buyer different options to terminate the contract.
Scholarly debate has focused on how much of the seller’s selling costs or overhead were
“consumed” by the breaching buyer and whether the default measure of damages ought to be
the full profit lost by the seller (which often is over compensatory) or incidental damages (which
may be under compensatory). But the focus on lost volume and selling costs is a red herring.
Rather, the choice between market damages and lost profits [in the lost volume cases is really]
a choice between alternative provisions [for terminating the contract].
Scott & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1483.
Contracting parties may choose different terms that provide a buyer the right to terminate an
executory contract for a fee. The choice of the termination fee will necessarily affect the price paid in the
ex ante contract by the buyer for the privilege to terminate. If the exercise price is very large, the option
price (reflected in the breach damages) may be very small. The parties do not intend that the option price
reflect the seller’s loss from the terminated sale. Indeed, the parties might rationally choose a free option
to terminate as a marketing tool. In sum, whether a given volume seller would have chosen to write an
option to a buyer and at what price the option would be offered simply cannot be determined a priori.
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not which damage default rule better protects a given economic advantage.
Rather, the ex ante perspective should frame the question: what economic
advantage did the contract protect?192 In Nobs Chemical, for example, the
fixed price contract functioned as an option on the future supply of the goods
at the contract price. The market damages the plaintiff claimed reflected the
ex ante value of the option.193 Substituting an ex post lost profits measure
undermined the value of the option contract and denied the plaintiff the
recovery it had paid for.194
In sum, in a fixed price market contract, the market damages default
rule supports the ex ante risk allocation that most parties would choose
precisely because it maximizes the value of the contract at the time it was
made. In cases where market damages might be thought to be excessive
because, as in Nobs Chemical, the injured party has laid off a portion of the
contract risk, a court that substitutes the ex post lost profits measure is, in
effect, imposing a mandatory limited damages rule. In the polar case, where
buyers breach contracts with volume sellers, a lost profits rule functions as a
mandatory cancellation penalty. In both cases, courts that are tempted by the
ex post fallacy to separate liability and remedy have impaired contract rights
that were paid for and compromised the ability of future parties to control
the allocation of market risks in ways that reflect their concern to maximize
the expected value of their contract.
The continued allegiance of courts to the just compensation principle is
supported and reinforced by pluralist scholars who rely on the doctrine to
support the broader claim that ex post review is essential to preserving
individual justice. The stubborn resistance of some courts and commentators
to the clear preference for market damages in the common law and the
Uniform Commercial Code is fueled by the argument that the mandatory
compensation principle (embodied in UCC §1-305(a))195 trumps the ex ante
market damages rules.196 Here, assertion substitutes for argument and
192. Henry Gabriel, The Seller’s Election of Remedies Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An
Expectation Theory, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429 (1988); Victor P. Goldberg, Reckoning Contract
Damages: Valuation of the Contract as an Asset, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 301 (2018).
193. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Protecting Reliance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1033 (2014); Scott &
Triantis, supra note 67.
194. An analogous problem occurs when the seller breaches a fixed price contract (after the market
rises) and the buyer has, before breach, contracted to resell the goods at a fixed price to a remote
purchaser. Here, courts have been similarly inclined to limit the buyer to its lost profits as measured by
the contract price/resale price differential, rather than awarding full market damages. See, e.g., Allied
Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 209 Cal. Rptr. 60 (Ct. App. 1984).
195. “The remedies provided by the Uniform Commercial Code must be liberally administered to
the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed . . . .” U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
196. See, e.g., Roy Ryden Anderson, A Look Back at the Future of UCC Damages Remedies:
Strategic Behavior and Market Price Damages, 71 SMU L. REV. 185, 196 (2018) (asserting that the most
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abandons careful analysis of ex ante intent. Thus, once again the vestiges of
centuries of policing penal bonds undermines respect for personal
sovereignty.
The default rules governing recovery of consequential damages are
another area where the compensation principle leads courts to promote
recoveries inconsistent with the terms that most parties would prefer. Under
current doctrine, for example, a seller must deliver conforming goods or pay
the buyer damages, including allowable consequential damages, measured
by the difference between the value of the goods accepted and the value of
conforming goods to the buyer.197 This damages default rule supports most
parties’ intentions because it increases the joint expected value of the
contract at the time of formation by motivating the seller to perform by
tendering goods when doing so will increase value. Early common law cases
limited a buyer’s ability to recover consequential damages by requiring a
tacit agreement between the parties as to the particular consequences that
affected the buyer’s valuation.198 However, most modern courts (encouraged
by the Second Restatement of Contracts and the UCC) have replaced the tacit
agreement test with a softer “reason to know” standard on the ground that
otherwise buyers would too readily be denied full compensation.199 But
valuations are often very difficult to verify. As a consequence, buyers often
have an incentive to overstate their valuations and, in the absence of an ex
ante agreement specifying the buyer’s valuation, sellers often are disabled
from insuring risks that turn on the buyers’ private information.
The “reason to know” standard for recovering consequential damages
functions unfairly to impose costs on sellers that were not contemplated in
the initial agreement. The result is that commercial parties routinely opt out
of the consequential damages default rule. In place of the default term,
parties create complex repair-and-replacement provisions that strive to
allocate the risks of product defects in other ways.200 This method of opting
out is a more costly and less accurate means of achieving the risk allocation
important reason why courts should not award ex ante market damages when the ex post losses are either
greater or smaller is that the compensation principle “does not allow it”).
197. U.C.C. § 2-714 (2), (3) (“The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at
the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have
had if they had been as warranted . . . In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under
[§ 2-715] may also be recovered.”).
198. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (“If the special circumstances under which
the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants . . . the damages
resulting from the breach . . . would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach
of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated.”).
199. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a); id. cmt 2 (“The ‘tacit agreement’ test . . . is rejected.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
200. For discussion, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 41.
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parties most prefer. Yet it would be unnecessary if courts appreciated the
moral hazard consequences of this extension of the compensation principle
and returned to the tacit consent doctrine.
B. HARDSHIP EXCUSES FOR FAILURES TO PERFORM: FORFEITURE,
FRUSTRATION, AND IMPRACTICABILITY
The black letter doctrines governing forfeiture,201 frustration,202
impracticability,203 and related doctrines excusing performance on grounds
of hardship illustrate the inherent tension between the ex ante and the ex post
in contemporary contract doctrine. There is a deep rift within the common
law between the ex ante contract doctrines requiring strict enforcement of
formal terms agreed to under free and fair conditions and the ex post
doctrines permitting abrogation of those terms when strict enforcement
appears to impose severe hardship. Here the ex post fallacy invites courts to
distort formal doctrine and interpret contracts in ways that undermine the
parties’ chosen ex ante means of accomplishing their contractual objectives.
1. The Reluctance to Enforce Express Contract Terms (Herein of
Forfeiture)
The doctrines of contract interpretation direct courts to respect the
parties’ express terms. Express terms can specify both primary terms
governing the parties’ performance obligations, and secondary, or meta,
terms governing the interpretation of their agreement.204 Express terms
therefore provide the most powerful tool available to parties for signaling
their ex ante intentions: they allow the parties not only to communicate to
each other and to courts the precise content of certain terms they wish to
include in their agreement, but to control the extent to which courts may
imply additional terms into their agreement.205 The doctrines governing the
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. b.
202. Id. § 265.
203. Id. § 261.
204. For example, as discussed in Part II.A supra, express written terms can constrain a court’s
discretion to imply terms into an agreement by directing the court under the parol evidence doctrine not
to admit prior evidence of implied terms. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202 (evidence not admissible to prove
even additional terms consistent with express terms of fully integrated writing); U.C.C. § 1-205(4)
(express terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade); U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (express terms
control course of performance); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 215 (evidence of prior or
contemporaneous agreements or negotiations is not admissible in evidence to contradict term of writing).
Id. § 216(1) (evidence of consistent additional term is not admissible to supplement fully integrated
agreement).
205. For discussion, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interaction Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 281–
86 (1985) (arguing that express terms are signals that enable parties to opt out of implied default terms
and to supplement the defaults with additional customized terms); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at
584–94 (maximizing party control over express terms promotes efficient contracting).
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interpretation of express terms thus present another occasion in which ex
post equity can undermine the parties’ ex ante intent. The law of conditions
vividly illustrates this deep tension between the formal obligation to respect
the parties’ ex ante specification of express terms and the desire to provide
ex post justice.
Since parties incur duties in contracts by making promises, a party who
makes an event a condition of its promise is under a duty to perform that
promise only if the event occurs.206 A common example is an insurance
contract that imposes on the insurer a duty to pay if the insured brings a claim
within a specified time period after the insured suffers a covered loss. The
insurer’s duty to pay arises when the insured suffers a covered loss, but that
duty is discharged if the insured fails to bring the claim within the specified
time period. The law of conditions explicitly endorses the principle of
personal sovereignty by committing to the strict enforcement of all express
conditions agreed to under free and fair circumstances.207 Yet it is also home
to the hoary equitable maxim that the law abhors a forfeiture.208 The antiforfeiture norm suffuses the law of conditions, which therefore reads like a
schizophrenic text, in one sentence insisting on the sanctity of strict
construction and enforcement of conditions in spite of forfeiture, while in the
next sentence admonishing courts, whenever interpretation allows, to avoid
the conclusion that the promisor’s obligation is subject to an enforceable
condition if enforcement of the condition would raise the specter of
forfeiture.209
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224. The event on which the promise is
conditioned may be “largely within the control of the obligor (the homeowner’s honest satisfaction with
the paint job), the obligee (the insured’s furnishing proof of loss), or a third person (the bank’s approval
of the mortgage application), or is largely beyond the control of anyone (damage as a result of fire).” E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 520 (3d ed. 1999).
207. Renovest Co. v. Hodges Dev. Corp., 600 A.2d 448, 452–53 (N.H. 1991) (“[W]hen the parties
expressly condition their performance upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event, rather than
simply including the event as one of the general terms of the contract, the parties’ bargained-for
expectation of strict compliance should be given effect.”); see also Nielsen v. Provident Sav. Life
Assurance Soc’y of N.Y., 66 P. 663, 665 (Cal. 1901) (“[C]onditions . . . when made, must be construed
and enforced . . . according to the expressed understanding of the parties making them. It is not for the
courts to dispense with such limitations and conditions, nor by judicial legislation to insert a different
contract from that deliberately made by the parties.”).
208. See, e.g., Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 116 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 1962) (“[It is a] wellrecognized principle that forfeitures are not favored either in law or equity . . . . One claiming forfeiture
carries a heavy burden of establishing his right thereto be clear and unmistakable proof.”); Stevenson v.
Parker, 608 P.2d 1263, 1267–68 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (“This court has held the general doctrine that
forfeitures are not favored in the law, and that courts should promptly seize upon any
circumstance . . . that would indicate an election or an agreement to waive the harsh, and at times unjust,
remedy of forfeiture . . . .” (quoting Spedden v. Sykes, 98 P. 752, 754 (Wash. 1908))).
209. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. b (“The policy favoring
freedom of contract requires that, within broad limits . . . the agreement of the parties should be honored
even though forfeiture results.”), id. § 226 cmt. c (“[T]o the extent that the parties have, by a term of their
agreement, clearly made an event a condition, they can be confident that a court will ordinarily feel
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The judicial embrace of the anti-forfeiture norm is another
manifestation of the ex post fallacy. Even if contracting parties write an
express term that unequivocally creates a condition, equity invites courts to
exercise their discretion ex post to excuse the condition whenever its
enforcement would create a forfeiture and the court finds the condition was
not a material part of the agreement at the time of formation.210 Even if a
court agrees that a contract contains a material, express condition, the norm
encourages the court to find that the promisor has implicitly waived the
condition, either retrospectively or prospectively, whenever enforcement of
the condition would create a forfeiture.211
In sum, the doctrinal residue of the forfeiture rule, which was designed
to prevent the abuse of penal bonds, explicitly stacks the deck heavily against
the finding and enforcement of conditions on the ground that the law abhors
a forfeiture. Viewed from the perspective of the commitment to vindicate the
parties’ ex ante intentions, the anti-forfeiture norm leads courts to make two
false assumptions. The first is that parties are unlikely to select terms that
create the risk of forfeiture. This assumption underlies the doctrines directing
courts to avoid finding a condition absent express language that
unmistakably creates it. The second assumption is that express conditions
sometimes are not material at the time of formation. This assumption
underlies the doctrines directing courts to avoid enforcing even clear, express
conditions. Yet contracting parties often favor the selection of precise terms
that create rule-like obligations that are easy for the parties not only to
observe but also to verify and enforce in court. Express conditions serve just
constrained strictly to apply that term”), and id. § 229 cmt. a (“[I]f the term that requires the occurrence
of the event as a condition is expressed in unmistakable language, the possibility of forfeiture will not
affect the interpretation of that language.”), with Bornholdt v. S. Pac. Co., 327 F.2d 18, 20 (9th Cir. 1964)
(“A condition involving a forfeiture must be strictly interpreted against the party for whose benefit it is
created. . . . Where there are two possible constructions, one of which leads to a forfeiture and the other
avoids it, the rule of law is well settled . . . that the construction which avoids forfeiture must be made if
it is at all possible.” (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1442 (Deering 1872))), and Kalina v. Eckert, 497 A.2d
1384, 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“[A] provision will not be construed to result in a forfeiture unless no
other reasonable construction is possible.”).
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229.
211. See, e.g., Knarston v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 73 P. 740, 741 (Cal. 1903) (“[T]he right to
declare a forfeiture, being a matter entirely for the benefit of a lessor or vendor, can be, even by parol,
effectually waived by either.”); Bielski v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 150 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Mich. 1967)
(“[W]aivers [of contract clause requiring arbitration as condition precedent to suit] need not be expressed
in terms, but may be implied by the acts, omissions, or conduct of the insurer or its agents authorized in
such respect.”) (quoting 29A AM. JUR. Insurance § 1617 (1936)); Cochran v. Grebe, 578 S.W.2d 351,
354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (asserting that forfeitures are highly disfavored by law and courts are therefore
quick to find a waiver or estoppel); Miraldi v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 356 N.E.2d 1234, 1236 (Ohio Ct. App.
1971) (law abhors forfeiture and waiver will be inferred whenever it can be reasonably inferred from the
facts); Brown v. Powell, 648 N.W.2d 329, 333 (S.D. 2002) (“Because forfeitures of land sale contracts
are highly disfavored by the law, courts are generally quick to find a waiver of conditions alleged as a
basis for a claim of breach.”).

2020] THE CASE AGAINST EQUITY IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW

1377

this purpose: they afford a promisor protection from certain risks, in lieu of
having to prove losses that are difficult to verify in a suit for damages.
When sophisticated commercial parties clearly agree to express
conditions, there is no principled reason to doubt that the promisee
understood the risk of forfeiture and bargained for compensating contractual
benefits from the promisor. On this view, conditions are always material
from the ex ante perspective because they allocate risks between the parties,
the contract compensates each party for bearing those risks, and the parties
inevitably rely on that allocation of risks. Since the parties’ intent at the time
of formation determines materiality, conditions will always be material.
More fundamentally, the concept of forfeiture begs the question by
presuming that the party against whom the condition is invoked is sacrificing
an entitlement. If the condition is agreed to and (presumably) paid for in the
ex ante contract, there is no entitlement to refuse to abide by the exercise of
the condition ex post.
2. The Misuse of Excuse
Ex post doctrines granting excuse from hardship, including mistake,
frustration, and commercial impracticability, are contemporary
manifestations of early equity’s effort to prevent the enforcement of the face
amount of a penal bond despite either full or substantial performance by the
promisor.212 When applied to a commercial contract reached under free and
fair conditions, the outcome can result in denial of individual justice for the
party seeking to enforce the terms agreed upon (and paid for) in the contract.
A particularly salient example is the well-known case, Aluminum Co. of
America v. Essex Group, Inc. (“ALCOA”).213 ALCOA is a paradigmatic
illustration of those instances where courts conclude that individual justice
requires them to intervene under the post-formation circumstances that have
materialized. In ALCOA, the court granted the plaintiff relief from the
contract’s detailed price indexing provision on the grounds of mutual
mistake, commercial impracticability, and frustration of purpose.214 While
212. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
213. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
214. Alcoa and Essex had entered into a long-term tolling contract whereby Alcoa undertook to
convert alumina supplied by Essex into aluminum. The contract specified a fixed quantity of seventy-five
million pounds of aluminum to be delivered to Essex per year. The contract contained a detailed price
indexing provision. At Essex’s insistence, the index relating to Alcoa’s costs included a circuit breaker if
the index rose too fast relative to the underlying market price, but Alcoa did not require a corresponding
“booster” if the index moved too slowly. Unfortunately for Alcoa, the index moved much too slowly
relative to the actual market price for alumina owing, in part, to the underrepresentation of energy costs
in the basket of inputs that comprise the WPI-IC relative to the costs of converting alumina into
aluminum. The court granted Alcoa relief on the grounds of mutual mistake, commercial impracticability,
and frustration of purpose. Rather than excuse Alcoa, however, the court chose to reform the contract by
rewriting the price term. Id. at 55–93.
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the reformation remedy adopted by the court in ALCOA has not been
followed elsewhere (as we have noted, claims of excuse are only rarely
granted by courts),215 nevertheless the case provides a vivid illustration of
how courts in other cases can use ex post reasoning in similar but more subtle
ways to vitiate ex ante intent.
One question in ALCOA was whether both parties were mistaken about
the ability of the price index to track future market prices as accurately as its
historical performance had indicated it would. The evidence strongly
suggests that both the Aluminum Company of America (“Alcoa”) and Essex
were allocating the risks of a deviation between market prices and the index
by agreeing to a carefully drafted pricing mechanism.216 By choosing a
precisely defined price index in conscious recognition of the risks that the
index might deviate from future market prices, the parties implicitly
allocated to the seller the risk that the index might malfunction and increase
too slowly, and allocated to the buyer the risk that the index might
malfunction and increase too rapidly. Essex chose to reduce the risk of the
index rising too rapidly by insisting on a circuit breaker once the index price
exceeded 65% of the market price of aluminum. Alcoa, represented by
sophisticated legal and economic experts, chose not to insert a corresponding
“booster’ should the index rise too slowly.
Despite these facts, the court held that Alcoa was excused from full
performance on the ground that both parties mistakenly believed that the
escalator term in the price index would function in the future in the same
way it had when tested against past economic conditions. The court rejected
the argument that the error, if any, was in predicting future economic
conditions and not in any erroneous beliefs relating “to the facts as they exist
at the time of the making of the contract”217 as required by the doctrine of
mutual mistake. The court was equally unmoved by the fact that black letter
doctrine requires a finding that the parties made a definite assumption that
the fact in question exists and made their agreement in the belief that there
was no risk with respect to it.218 Clearly, there was sufficient sense of risk to
motivate Essex to insert a cap on the risk that market prices might outstrip
215. Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and
Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 317 (1992).
216. The parties incurred substantial front-end drafting costs. These costs are rational to incur only
if they exploit the parties’ informational advantage ex ante. For discussion, see Robert E. Scott & George
G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 822–51 (2006).
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The court held
that the mistake did not relate to future economic conditions but rather was a mistake as to a “present
actuarial error.” Aluminum Co., 499 F. Supp. at 63.
218. TIMOTHY MURRAY, ARTHUR L. CORBIN, JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN E. MURRAY, JR.,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §605 (1960).
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the escalator.
The court in ALCOA also found grounds to excuse Alcoa based on
commercial impracticability and frustration of purpose. These doctrines
grant excuse only if one party experiences extreme hardship because of a
future event whose occurrence was unforeseeable.219 The court did not even
address the question of whether the occurrence of an unforeseeable future
event was essential to granting excuse on the grounds of impracticability or
frustration.220 Rather, the court focused exclusively on the element of
hardship, finding that Alcoa’s losses of $8 million after 10 years, coupled
with projections that future losses might total $60 million, was sufficient to
grant relief from hardship. This finding runs counter to the statements by
many courts that the hardship necessary to grant excuse must “be more than
merely onerous or expensive. It must be positively unjust to hold the parties
bound.”221
The court in ALCOA claimed to be maintaining fidelity to the parties’
contractual intent by reforming the price index when it did not function as
the parties anticipated it would. The court’s solution was to guarantee that
Alcoa could at least recover its costs plus a minimum one cent per pound
profit.222 Even if the court correctly divined that the parties’ purpose in this
case was to implement the equivalent of a cost-plus contract, the ex post
intervention was indefensible. The court’s decision undermined the parties’
careful efforts to design their contract optimally. By distorting the doctrines
of mistake, impracticability, and frustration, the court deprived the parties of
their ex ante choice of how best to mimic a cost-plus contract while avoiding
the moral hazard risk that such a contract would impose on Essex.
Furthermore, the prospect of ex post judicial intervention under these
circumstances severely impairs the ability of future commercial parties to
choose the contract terms that best achieve their purposes.
219. E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
220. On the question of foreseeability, the court held that “the foreseeability of a variation between
the [escalator term] and Alcoa’s costs would not preclude relief under the doctrine of impracticability.”
Aluminum Co., 499 F. Supp. at 76. The case occurred during the period of volatile energy prices in the
1970s owing to changes in environmental standards and the OPEC oil embargo. Other courts have
consistently held that events owing to the energy crisis of the 1970s were reasonably foreseeable by
commercial parties contracting during this period. E. Air Lines, 415 F. Supp., at 441.
221. Ocean Tramp Tankers v. V/O Sovfracht (the Eugenia) [1964] 2 QB 226, 239; see also NealCooper Grain Co. v. Texan Gulf Sulfur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 293 (7th Cir. 1974); Schafer v. Sunset Packing
Co., 474 P.2d 529 (Or. 1970).
222. Aluminum Co., 499 F. Supp. at 80. The court held that the failure of the price index to achieve
the parties’ ends was: (1) a mistake of both parties as to a basic assumption of the contract justifying
rescission on the grounds of mutual mistake, (2) the occurrence of an event whose non-occurrence was a
basic assumption of the contract justifying excuse on the grounds of commercial impracticability, and (3)
the occurrence of an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption thus frustrating Alcoa’s
principal purposes under the contract. Id.
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To be sure, ALCOA may be seen as an outlier; a court ignoring
controlling legal principles to grant excuse from hardship to a Fortune 500
company contracting with a much smaller firm. Cases like ALCOA, however,
have a feedback effect by prompting pluralist scholars to call for an even
broader exercise of ex post judicial review in cases of alleged hardship.
Melvin Eisenberg, a leading pluralist scholar, has recently argued for
expanding the domain of the excuse doctrines based on the presumed
inability of private actors to anticipate remote risks.223 Eisenberg argues that
ex post relief should be granted if, because of an unexpected rise in prices,
performance would result in a loss to a promisor that is significantly greater
than the risk the parties reasonably would have expected the promisor to
take.224 In a similar vein, Robert Hillman has argued for a pluralist approach
to commercial impracticability that considers fairness norms.225 Hillman
identifies a number of fairness norms that should determine whether one
party to an agreement is entitled to cease or curtail performance, such as
when the parties fail expressly to allocate the risk of a calamitous event. Here
he argues that the courts should adjust the contract ex post based on the
fairness principle that the parties should agree to share unallocated losses.226
The irony, of course, is that calls to increase ex post intervention for hardship
on fairness grounds is unfair to the party who paid the counterparty to bear
the risk in question.
C. EX POST INTERVENTION TO SANCTION OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR
Breach of contract claims are the result of many different factors. Often
one of the parties has inadvertently failed to fulfill its obligations under the
contract. A second possibility, however, is that the dispute occurs because
one of the parties is opportunistically violating the deal. As we discussed in
Part II, pluralist scholars have argued that the task of policing opportunism
is an appropriate exercise of ex post intervention by common law courts.227
Ayotte, Friedman, and Smith believe that the risk of opportunistic breach is
sufficiently grave that courts should zealously deploy their equity powers ex
post to punish the opportunistic party, even in the face of an ex ante
agreement explicitly assigning the contract rights to the alleged
opportunist.228 They contend that this heightened risk of opportunism
223. Eisenberg, supra note 15. For a critique of Eisenberg’s analysis, see Victor P. Goldberg,
Excuse Doctrine: The Eisenberg Uncertainty Principle, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 359 (2010).
224. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 209.
225. Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 617 (1983).
226. Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern
Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 3.
227. George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1994).
228. See Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 38.
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undermines any argument that contracting parties are equipped to deal with
the risk of opportunism in advance through free and fair ex ante contracting.
Pluralists typically advert to the obligation of good faith as the doctrinal
mechanism for policing opportunism. However, the claim that good faith can
and should be used as an all-purpose weapon for aggressively pursuing ex
post justice badly misunderstands the role of good faith in American contract
law. To be sure, both the Restatement and the UCC affirm the duty of good
faith and fair dealing that attaches to the performance of every contract.229
But the foundation of the obligation of good faith in American contract law
is the shared interest of both parties at the time of contract to reduce the
incidence of behavior that may impair performance of the deal. As §1-304,
Comment 1 of the UCC makes clear, in American contract law the obligation
of good faith is not an independent invitation for courts to police bargained
for exchanges.230 Rather, good faith is an interpretive principle based on the
presumed ex ante intent of both parties to forego behaviors that might lead
to tit-for-tat retaliation. By reinforcing informal norms of trust and good
faith, the parties reduce the expected haggling costs that can result from
period-to-period efforts to extract maximum individual gains.231
In short, good faith in American contract law serves the ex ante goals
of individual justice. The common law and UCC’s good faith doctrines do
not invite courts to sanction bad faith actions232 by vitiating contractual
intent, as pluralist scholars maintain. Rather, the good faith requirement
reflects the judicial presumption that parties ordinarily intend to maximize
their expected joint gains by relying on courts to enforce norms of trust and
fairness only when the conditions under which non-legal norms usually
operate break down.
***
We have outlined the many ways that the vestigial doctrines developed
by equity to police the abuses of penal bonds at early common law
undermine respect for personal sovereignty, the value that we have argued
best explains American contract law. Moreover, we have seen how pluralist
scholars have used the residue of ex post doctrine to push for an expansion
of equity into many other domains of contract, including by empowering
courts to reallocate risks in order to promote paternalism or prevent
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
230. U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1.
231. For discussion, see Scott, supra note 103.
232. The Restatement defines bad faith actions as including “lack of diligence and slacking
off . . . and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d.
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opportunism. By continuing to recognize and apply the ex post doctrines,
courts and commentators perpetuate and exacerbate the significant harm
these doctrines create by gratuitously increasing the burdens and lowering
the benefits of contracting, thereby undermining respect for personal
sovereignty within contract law.
CONCLUSION
Given that the ex post doctrines of contract law no longer serve the
purpose of policing against abuses of penal bonds in the common law, the
puzzle is not why courts are reluctant to apply them, but why they apply them
at all. Our answer is that the near sacred status of stare decisis, the historically
entrenched ex post perspective on remedies, and the powerful appeal of the
ex post fallacy have together placed the ex post doctrines beyond judicial
reflection. Moreover, by devoting five of its sixteen chapters to extensive
endorsement of the ex post doctrines, the Second Restatement of Contracts
effectively enshrined them in the black letter pantheon of valid contract
law.233 Their formal investiture in the Restatement was the culmination of
the centuries-old common law practice of treating disproportionate outcomes
as inherently unjust and unfair. But the common law causes of action that
gave rise to liability during the period in which this practice evolved left the
remediation of legal wrongs entirely to the courts. The transformation of
American contract law into an institution that enforced executory agreements
enabled the parties to control not only the extent of their liability but the
consequences of breach as well. Yet the instinctive judicial aversion to
forfeitures and penalties—a product of the longstanding practice of policing
against the fraudulent enforcement of penal bonds—was too strong to yield
to the new logic of the ex ante perspective in contract adjudication. Fueled
by stare decisis, the old equitable doctrines remained on the books even as
courts have struggled to reconcile the inherent contradiction between
contract law’s ex ante perspective and the ex post abrogation of the parties’
agreement. That subterranean tension continues to destabilize contract
adjudication today.
The case for retaining the ex post doctrines turns on whether they now
serve a new and compelling purpose. However, the only purposes identified
by proponents of ex post doctrine—paternalism and anti-opportunism—are
deeply incompatible with the promotion and protection of personal
sovereignty. In our view, the personal sovereignty account provides the most
morally compelling, and therefore the best, explanation of American contract
law’s ex ante doctrines. Given that these doctrines not only comprise the
233.

These include Chapters 6, 8, 9, 11, and 16.
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overwhelming majority of American contract doctrines, but also form its
foundational core, the continued recognition of the ex post doctrines as valid
components of American contract law cannot be justified. The time has come
for courts and commentators to prune the ex post vestigial branch from the
common law tree.
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